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1. Summary  
This review synthesises the literature from academic, policy and institutions sources on the 
drivers of job creation in the Sahel countries Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. 
The report first shows a baseline on employment in the five Sahel countries. Data from the World 
Bank shows that with the exception of Mauritania the countries are among the highest labour 
force participation rate in sub-Saharan Africa, while very low on employee’s levels. For sub-
Saharan standards, Mauritania has very high level of wage and salaried workers (51.2% in 
2016), while around 10% for the other four countries. Unemployment rates are the highest in 
Mauritania (9.8% in 2016) and for the countries, unemployment is higher for youth and women 
(except from Niger where women unemployment is a little below the official unemployment rate), 
according to the World Bank data for 2016. Between 40% (Mauritania) and 50% (Niger) of the 
population is under 15 years. The population is expected to grow more than double in size in 
2050, for example in Mali the expected net annual increase in the labour force is around 200 
thousand workers in the next 20 years (IMF, 2015). Urbanisation rates in the Sahel countries are 
low in comparison with other countries is sub-Saharan Africa, in particular in Chad (23%) and 
Burkina Faso (32%). Mauritania again is different with the highest urbanisation level of 61%. 
The Sahel countries are amongst the countries with the highest employment rates in the 
agriculture sector in sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank data for 2016). Chad has one of the highest 
level of employment in agriculture with 87% in 2016. Niger and Mauritania also belong to the 
countries with the highest employment rates in agriculture, both with 76%. In Mali employment in 
the agricultural sector is growing since 2004, while in Burkina Faso jobs in agriculture are vastly 
declining since 2006. For the other jobs, employment is dominated by the informal sector with all 
countries above 90% of workers in informal jobs (% of total non-agricultural employment). For 
example, in Burkina Faso with a total employment rate of 6.4 million people it was estimated that 
just 685,625 have formal jobs in 2015, of which 22.6% are government employees (IMF, 2018). 
In Niger 80% of the mining workforce works in the informal sector (US Department of State, 
2013). In particular, in Mauritania the informal labour force has seen a widespread increase of 
migrant labour force.  
A more detailed look at the economic sectors in the Sahel countries shows that the food 
economy and the non-food agricultural sector (mainly cotton) are the main providers for jobs. The 
share of employment in the food economy (on-farm and off-farm) compared to total 
employment are the highest for all West-African countries, with rates higher than 80% of total 
employment, with only Mauritania below the West-African average with 52%. With the exception 
of Mauritania, the share of food economy employment in the total rural employment for the Sahel 
is the highest for the West African region (with Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso all well above 90%). 
However, only Niger and Burkina Faso have the high share of food economy employment in the 
total urban employment (50% and 47% respectively) (Allen et al., 2018). 99% of employment in 
agriculture relates to food agriculture, however, farmers in Burkina Faso and Mali in particular 
rotate food crops with the non-food crop cotton, and as such are partly working in the food 
economy. Furthermore, those in agriculture work significantly fewer hours than those in 
downstream segments of the food economy (Allen et al., 2018).  
Maize, millet, rice and sorghum are the main staple crops. Livestock are the most traded 
products between West African countries and the sector employs approximately 30% of total 
employment (in case of Mali). The rural population in Mali, living in settlements of less than 5,000 
inhabitants and involved in livestock farming systems, is extremely significant: at 60% of the total 
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population. However, this share is expected to decrease down to 40% by 2050 due to the 
expansion of crop cultivation (Ly et al., 2010). Fishery is in some areas an important sector, but 
with the exception of Mauritania, mostly combined at household level with farming or livestock. In 
Mauritania, fisheries as an economic sector is important, accounting for 10% of GDP and 50% of 
export earnings.  
Off-farm employment in food economy is far lower in the Sahel countries than in other West 
African countries, with the exception of Mauritania. In Mali and Niger the share is 9%, in Burkina 
Faso 13%, in Chad 15% and in Mauritania 24% (West Africa average is 22%) (Allen et al, 2018). 
Food marketing is the largest off-farm segment, while processing is smaller. The non-farm 
employment in food economy relates more to urban areas. With employment in food processing 
in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger respectively 34%, 41% and 40% based in urban areas. 
Employment in the processing sector is dominated by women and tends to be unskilled and 
labour intensive. Food marketing is even stronger related to urban areas in these countries (46% 
in Mali and 57% in Burkina Faso) (Allen et al., 2018). 
Non-food agriculture exists mainly of cotton (Mali, Burkina Faso and Chad) and some other 
niche products as shea nuts. According to the FAO 4 million Burkinabes (22% of the population) 
support themselves through activities connected to the cotton sector, however, mainly related to 
agriculture and less to processing. For Mali and Burkina Faso, 98% of the cotton is exported, the 
remaining 2% remains in the countries for processing into artisanal weaving yarns (unbleached, 
white, and dyed thread) and printed fabrics (bogolan fabrics, woven cloth, and woven koba). 
Although an important export product (the countries are the world’s number six and seven 
exporters of cotton, mainly to Bangladesh garment industry), the sector counts for low value 
added to the economy (US GAIN, 2018). Low wages for hired labour on smallholdings also 
interact closely with risks associated with involuntary labour, and combined with high levels of 
child labour, have important implications for rural livelihoods. The cotton sector is increasing 
again, due to support programmes and higher market prices, after a decline in productivity in the 
1990s and start of 2000s. In Chad, the cotton industry is still in decline.  
The extractive industry is increasing rapidly in the region (Chad mainly oil, Mauritania mainly 
iron, Niger mainly Uranium, and Burkina Faso and Mali mainly gold). However, modern large-
scale mining does not employ many workers. It has historically been capital-intensive, and this 
feature increased with technological progress. Thus, extractive industries, like oil and gas 
industry or mining industry, could be characterised of being cut off from the domestic economy 
except through royalties and taxes. For example, the mining industry officially employs 3,700 
people in Mali, mainly in gold mining – an amount that over the years has not very much 
changed (Chuhan-Pole et al., 2017). For every one mining job created, 1.67 jobs are created 
elsewhere through backward linkages and expenditure effects (Sanoh & Coulibaly, 2015). In 
other words, the multiplier effects are limited, partly because of the capital intensity of the mining 
industry, but also because of the lack of local cost-effective procurement opportunities (Chuhan-
Pole, 2017).  
Manufacturing and construction are industries that are underdeveloped in the region. 
Manufacturing is mainly related to the agro-pastoral sector by processing food (crops, seed oils, 
fish and livestock) and non-food agricultural products (cotton and shea nuts). 50% of the 
employment in the secondary sector relates to the processing of food in Niger, 38% in Burkina 
Faso and 32% in Mali (Allen et al., 2018). The manufacturing in Niger counts only for 6% of GDP 
in 2016 and in Burkina Faso manufacturing accounted for 6.6% of GDP in 2015 and the share of 
manufactured goods in total export of goods was in 2014 10.4% (IMF, 2018b). In Chad the sector 
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counts for 3.2% of GDP in 2016. In particular, de-industrialisation could be witnessed in Mali, the 
numbers show that Mali’s manufacturing sector has steadily contracted as a share of output as 
percentage of GDP (from 12% in 1995 to 7% in 2013) while it remained flat in most other 
countries in West Africa (IMF, 2015). On the other hand, the share of output of agriculture 
remained stable, while in other countries in the West African region its share had declined (IMF, 
2015).  
In the timespan of this research, no recent literature could be found on exact numbers of people 
working in service sectors (private or public sector workers). Only for Burkina Faso recent data 
shows that the government wage bill has increased rapidly since 2000, reflecting a large 
expansion in government employment, particularly in education and security (IMF, 2016). 
The literature shows that the drivers of more formal and productive jobs in the Sahel could be: 
 Trade openness: Manufactured exports measured per capita in the Sahel countries 
is far below the average for low-income countries. To increase manufacturing 
exports, the countries must open their trade and improve their trans-border 
infrastructure. Regional trade in particular provides possibilities to create jobs by 
reaching into markets with higher demand than in the small Sahel countries. Formal 
as informal traders show a great ability to invest in commercial networks and routes. 
Drawing upon kinship, ethnic and religious ties, their embedded business networks 
help to reduce business risks, pool complementary skills, improve access to new 
markets and safeguard property rights, which is important in an uncertain 
environment such as the Sahel (Walther, 2014). However, poor infrastructure, 
inefficient customs and other issues hamper trade flows within the region, despite the 
positive impact of proximity of countries. The costs of trade clearly seem to be a 
significant obstacle not only for integration or rather participating in global trade but 
also for integration within the ECOWAS region (Lange et al., 2016). 
 Industrial clusters linking up with inclusive value chains: Production, 
manufacturing and service industries should cluster together, as clusters they 
generate more productivity gains and job creation, by attracting new industry into a 
sparse industrial landscape, like the Sahel countries. For the Sahel forward and 
backward linkages in manufacturing clusters are most promising related to the food 
economy and some non-food cash crops as cotton and shea nuts. Creating an 
industrial cluster that add more value, needs to be competitive in the international 
market and relies on public and private investment in infrastructure and capacity 
building. However, the literature mentions the complexity around the creation of 
industrial clusters within inclusive value chains, which should absorb workers from 
the agricultural sector and informal sector in cities. Until now, inclusive business 
models tend to be far from collaborating with informal economic systems and actors 
in search for mutual benefit.  
 Green economy: Driver of non-traditional job creation in the Sahel countries is the 
green economy, mainly in renewable energy sources, in particular solar energy. 
Burkina Faso opened the biggest solar installation in West Africa in 2017 and Mali is 
investing in solar plants. No studies could be found for the Sahel of what this means 
for employment, but the direct employment generation could be very small, as the 
technology is imported and, in case of Burkina Faso, built by French companies. 
However, big solar installations are not the only way to deliver renewable energy to 
the population. A new industry of mini-solar systems for poor households can create 
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more direct jobs and more importantly, generates spill-overs to give communities 
more productive opportunities where they are not connected to the grid. From 
literature it shows that up to 15,000 new jobs have been created in the wider 
economy in sub-Saharan Africa as a result of the transition to efficient off-grid lighting 
(UNEP, 2014). The combination of more and better light, access to ICTs and 
awareness of solar technology increases opportunities of marketing new services 
and technologies to off-grid populations. Entrepreneurs enter the market with special 
applications for mobile phones, SMS-services and solar enabled technologies (e.g. 
solar PV irrigation pumps, solar PV cool storage, solar PV food dryers), with the 
potential to increase economic development and output (IRENA, 2016).      
 Linking entrepreneurship, innovation and skills to markets: For better and formal 
job creation, the Sahel countries need higher capability firms and enterprises. Value-
chain relationships between different firms need to be promoted and need specific 
skills for entrepreneurs and employees. Education as an important solution in 
keeping up with changing economic and technological developments, for productivity 
growth, and in closing the skills gap and allowing more people to find suitable jobs 
(Bhorat et al, 2016). Better entrepreneurship skills can increase productivity and 
upscaling of small enterprises, also with a better chance of growing out of informal 
sector. However, low skill attainment and literacy, currently stifle job growth in the 
Sahel countries. A study (USAID, 2017) identified key barriers to livelihoods 
diversification efforts: insufficient literacy, education, training, and access to credit, 
skills, and networks to productively engage in micro‐ or small enterprises outside of 
traditional farming and livestock activities. There is a need for increased training and 
support for aspiring entrepreneurs, including improving access to credit, 
apprenticeships, and information to expand opportunities. 
 Investments: Public investment is critical to support the delivery of key public 
services and catalyse economic growth and poverty reduction. For instance, public 
investment in social infrastructure is essential to improve the access to education, to 
invest in skills gap, while investments in economic infrastructure (e.g., roads and 
electricity) should help expand integrate and expand economic sectors and favour 
the generation of private sector employment. However, beyond its level, the 
efficiency of public investment is crucial. Improvements in public investment 
management (PIM) are key to enhance the efficiency and productivity of public 
investment (IMF, 2018). In the Sahel countries public investment is on the rise, 
however, with low efficiency rates. Only in Chad public investments declined 
significantly in 2016 due to low revenues from the oil sector. Private sector 
investments are important, but the Sahel countries still are among the lowest in the 
World Bank Doing Business ranking, and the investments that enter the country 
should be linked with local value chains and efforts against price shifting to increase 
corporate tax income revenues, which the countries rely heavily on for public 
spending. For example, a World Bank report (2018) emphasises for Mauritania the 
need to establish a more effective public investment management system, prioritising 
projects that combine economic performance and social impact (World Bank, 2018).  
As shown, these drivers will not generate jobs automatically. They need good governance, good 
(investment) management skills in public and private sector, and human security and conflict 
prevention to guarantee stability. The main challenges for the region to create jobs are the 
following (and are mainly the focus of donor interventions, see appendix): 
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 Demography – The demographic growth dividend remains negligible in the Sahel as 
fertility rates decline only modestly and the labour market currently unable to absorb the 
new workers in productive activities (IMF, 2016). With the limits to the manufacturing and 
service sectors to absorb new workers, any excess labour force will seek informal 
employment in urban areas or in subsistence agriculture.  
 Security: Insecurity has increased in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad. The region is 
prone to human insecurity, instability and faces a high level of refugees. The security 
relates to youth unemployment, food insecurity, high levels of smuggling (goods, arms, 
drugs and migrants to Europe).  
 Skills gap: Opportunities for wage employment are limited and few people are employed 
in the formal sector, in part because of low skills that are not corresponding to the higher 
skill levels that are needed in the formal economy.  
Fortunately, there are some opportunities: 
 Urbanisation: Urbanisation and rising incomes are driving major transformations, in 
particular in the food economy. Although, the Sahel countries are among the least 
urbanised countries in the world, urbanisation is taking place gradually, shaping a 
gradual transformation of the food economy, with the opportunity to create jobs in urban 
and peri-urban areas related to food systems.  
 Remittances - Remittances to Sahel countries have increased significantly and are 
expected to rise further. In literature, remittances are linked to economic activities in the 
countries, giving opportunities for productive investment for small businesses (Fransen et 
al., 2016). The data for the Sahel shows the regional link, with most remittances going to 
neighbouring countries, which is good for building social networks that could drive further 
regional openness and trade.  
 Advancements in food system thinking - In the Sahel, promoting non-agricultural 
employment will depend on supporting private enterprises, in particular SMEs, to drive 
growth and job creation (Allen et al., 2018). Policies aimed at supporting value chain 
development, integrated skills development and systems as well as improving the overall 
business climate are important elements in the jobs agenda. In addition, off-farm 
activities and the food economy in general, play a particularly important role in women’s 
employment. As the appendix shows, many of the donor interventions in the region relate 
to building food systems and value chains by creating new food markets and increasing 
skills and entrepreneurship. 
 Spending productively public revenues from extractive sector – Another opportunity 
is to use the revenues from the extractive industry for investments in job creation. The 
Sahel saw a rapid increase in investments in the extractive industry and IMF and World 
Bank are among others funding projects and programmes to increase the efficiency of 
these investments with by creating more spill-overs.  
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2. Employment data and trends  
World Bank data1 shows that for 2016 the labour force participation rate (% of total population 
ages 15+) was the highest in Niger (78.9%), Mali (71.2%) and Chad (71.2%) and above the 
average for sub-Saharan Africa (68.2%). Burkina Faso has a rate of 66.7% and Mauritania is well 
below the average with 49.4%. Comparing the G5 Sahel countries, Mauritania has a high level of 
wage and salaried workers (51.2% of total employment). Chad (8.2%), Niger (10.6%), Mali (11%) 
and Burkina Faso (12%) all have very low employees’ levels, all very much below the sub-
Saharan African average of 26%. By using the 2016 data from the Word Bank website, the G5 
Sahel countries have a total employment ranging from 8.1 million in total employment in Niger, 
6.4 million in Burkina Faso, 6.2 million in Mali and 5.1 million in Chad. Mauritania is by far the 
smallest with 1.1 million in total employment. The GDP per person employed in Mauritania is 
the highest with US$13,388, this is higher than the average in sub-Saharan Africa (US$9,517), 
while the other four G5 Sahel countries are amongst the lowest levels of GDP per person 
employed in sub-Saharan Africa: US$2,317 in Niger, US$4,685 in Burkina Faso, US$5,220 in 
Chad and US$5,854 in Mali. 
The data from the Work Bank also shows that unemployment rates in the G5 Sahel are not 
amongst the highest in sub-Saharan Africa, in particular in comparison with countries like South 
Africa, Mozambique, Namibia, Botswana, which all exceeded 15% unemployment rates in 2016. 
Niger has the lowest official unemployment rates, with 0.3% of the labour force counted as 
unemployed. The country’s rate declined from approximately 5% in the 1990s to 3.1% in 2007. 
Chad has a total unemployment rate as percentage of labour force of 5.8%, which has been 
stable since the 1990s. Burkina Faso has a total unemployment rate of 6.5% - it shows a rising 
trend of unemployment over the 2000s from 2.6% in 2000. Mali has a total unemployment rate of 
7.8% - a trend of lower rates from its peak in 2007 of 11.7%. Mauritania has the highest 
unemployment rates of 9.8%, which has been stable for over the last 20 years.  
Unemployment is higher for youth and women in all five Sahel countries, according to the World 
Bank data for 2016. The female unemployment rate (share of women aged 15-64 who are 
without work, but available for and seeking employment as percentage of total labour force) in 
Chad is 6.8%. Youth unemployment (the share of people aged 15-24 that are in the labour force 
seeking employment, but unable to find employment) is higher in Chad, but stable for over 20 
years, with 10.1%. In Burkina Faso unemployment rates for women are increasing, with 3.6% 
female unemployment rate in 2007 and 9.3% in 2016. Youth unemployment is rising as well, but 
at a lower rate with 4.9% youth unemployment in 2007 and 8.6% in 2016. In Mali, female 
unemployment rates are slightly higher in 2015 and 2016 with 8.6%, but not high as in the peak 
year 2007 with 13.9%. More significantly, Mali shows a rise in youth unemployment in 2015 and 
2016 to 18.1%, which means that it is back to the same high level as in the peak year of 2007. 
Mauritania has high levels of youth unemployment (17.8%) and female unemployment (12.6%) 
over a period of 20 years, just with a small decline in female unemployment rates since 2000 
(14%). Niger has very low official unemployment rates, including for youth (0.5%) and women 
(with 0.2% - the only country where it is lower than the total unemployment rate). 
                                                   
1 World Bank, Jobs Data, 2016 (searched for Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and sub-Saharan 
Africa: http://datatopics.worldbank.org/jobs/ (derived October, 2018). 
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Most of the G5 Sahel are amongst the countries with the highest employment rates in the 
agriculture sector (World Bank data for 2016). Chad has one of the highest level of employment 
in agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa with 87% and stable at that level for over 20 years (5% 
industry; 8% services). Niger and Mauritania also belong to the countries with the highest 
employment rates in agriculture, both with 76%. In Mauritania the level is slightly decreasing from 
80% in the 1990s, as services have grown slightly, while more stable for Niger. In Niger, 7% 
worked in industry and 17% in services in 2016. Also in Mauritania, 7% worked in industry and 
17% in services (13% in 2000). Data from Mali and Burkina Faso show different trends: in Mali 
employment in the agricultural sector is growing since 2004, while in Burkina Faso jobs in 
agriculture are vastly declining since 2006. In 2016 agriculture counted for 62% of employment in 
Mali (42% in 2004), while 8% in industry and 30% in services. In Burkina Faso, 29% of total 
employment is in agriculture (81% in 2006), while 32% in industry and 39% in services in 2016.   
The population in the Sahel countries is young. The World Bank data (2017) estimates that 
nearly half of the population is 15 years or younger, with the exception of Mauritania which is 
40% in 2017 (Niger has the highest of 50.2%, followed by Mali 47.7%, Chad 47.1%, Burkina 
Faso 45.2%).2 In Mali 40% of the population is aged between 15 and 40 and youth 
unemployment rates are extremely high in the rural areas (FAOb, 2017, p.1). The population is 
expected to grow more than double in size, for example the prognoses for Mali is that the 
population will increase from the current 18 million people to 45 million in 2050 (IMF, 2018a, p.6). 
The expected net annual increase in the labour force in Mali is around 200 thousand workers in 
the next 20 years (IMF, 2015, p.13). The urbanisation rate is low in the G5 Sahel countries (in 
particular in Chad and Burkina Faso) and gradually growing over the years: in 2017 22.8% of the 
population in Chad were living in urban areas, 31.5% in Burkina Faso, 41.4% in Mali, 49.4% in 
Niger and 61% in Mauritania.3  
Gender gaps are lower at higher levels of education, however, the unemployment rate increases 
with education. For example, in Burkina Faso the unemployment rate among young graduates is 
34.5% for higher education graduates and 17.2% for secondary education graduates (IMF, 
2018b, p.5). Female unemployment rates are higher than those of men at all levels of education 
and reach in Mali 34% for higher educated women. Paid employment rates for females are also 
lower in the Sahel countries compared to the West African region. For instance, in Niger’s capital 
city Niamey the paid employment rate for females is 29%, while 57% in Lome, Togo (Nordman et 
al., 2011).  
Up till now employment is still dominated by the informal sector with all countries above 90% of 
workers in informal jobs (% of total non-agricultural employment): with in Burkina Faso 94.6% of 
workers in informal jobs (IMF, 2018b, p.6), in Mali 96.6%,4 and 93% in Niger. In 2015 the number 
of formal jobs in Burkina Faso was estimated at 685,625 of which 22.6% are government 
employees. 24.2% of the total formal jobs were occupied by women, 33.3% are women with jobs 
in the public sector and 21.6% are women in private sector jobs in 2015 (IMF, 2018b, p.6). In 
2010 in Niger there were 40,400 public employees of those 30% were women (Danish Trade 
Union, 2014, p.15). In 2007, there were 54,000 persons in formally waged private or semi-public 
employment (Danish Trade Union, 2014, p.15). It is estimated that 80% of the mining workforce 
                                                   
2 Data from World Bank Data website: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.0014.TO.ZS?locations=TD-
ML-BF-MR-NE (derived October, 2018). 
3 Data derived from Statista Portal: https://www.statista.com/ (October, 2018). 
4 International Labour Organization, ILOSTAT database.  
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works in the informal sector.5 Informal labour in the Sahel countries is characterised by child 
labour, limited demand and small market, no access to soft loans or with high interest rates, lack 
of equipment, tools and material and limited support for increasing skills. In Mauritania the 
informal labour force also includes a widespread increase of migrant labour force that 
monopolises certain jobs in the informal sector such as construction (al-Mahboubi, 2016, p.155).  
3. Employment in food economy 
Allen et al. (2018, p.8) show that for the total food economy (including food agriculture, 
processing, marketing and food-away-from-home) the share of employment in the food economy 
compared to total employment in Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad and Mali are the highest for all 
West-African countries: it accounts for more than 80% of total employment, while Mauritania is 
below the West-African average with 52%. Employment patterns in the food economy of West 
Africa are primarily driven by local food demand (Tschirley et. al., 2016). At the regional level, the 
vast majority of food consumption comes from local food production, with food imports 
representing 8% of total food expenditure (Allen & Heinrigs, 2016), counting for 4% in Mali and 
Burkina Faso, 5% in Mauritania and 7% in Niger (no data is available for Chad) (Allen et al., 
2018, p.9). 
The share of food economy employment in the total rural employment for the Sahel is the highest 
for the West African region, with the exception of Mauritania (with Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso 
all well above 90%). Niger and Burkina Faso also have the highest share of food economy 
employment in the total urban employment (50% and 47%) (Allen et al., 2018, p.15). The Sahel 
countries show lower food agriculture employment in urban areas (2% of the total food economy 
employment in Mali, 4% in Niger and 7% in Burkina Faso) in comparison with other West African 
countries (e.g. Senegal 13% and Ghana 18%) (Allen et al., 2018, p.13). In urban areas there are 
some micro-plots and in some urban areas fishing communities contribute to food agriculture in 
urban areas, however, Allen et al. (2018) expect that the majority of employment in urban areas 
in the segment food agriculture are “likely to be inflated by households living in urban areas but 
engaging in farming activities located outside urban boundaries” (2018, p.15). What the literature 
shows is that the food economy in the Sahel countries, measured in employment, both in rural 
and urban areas, is important. 
On-farm employment in food economy 
Within the food economy the food agriculture segment represents the highest rate of 
employment, with Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Chad again among the countries with the 
highest rates in West Africa all well above 80% (Allen et al., 2018, p.9). 99% of employment in 
agriculture relates to food agriculture (Allen et al., 2018, p.7). However, farmers in Burkina Faso 
and Mali in particular rotate food crops with the non-food crop cotton, and as such are partly 
working in the food economy. Furthermore, those in agriculture work significantly fewer hours 
than those in downstream segments of the food economy. On average, farmers work 26 hours a 
week (first declared activity only), compared to 39 hours on average in downstream segments 
(Christiaensen & Premand, 2017). This time-related, or visible, underemployment in agriculture is 
linked to its seasonal nature and/or contexts where surplus production (and hence additional 
labour effort) does not pay because markets are absent or too costly to reach (Christiaensen & 
                                                   
5 Derived from the US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour, Niger Country 
Report on Human Rights Practices (2013). 
10 
Premand, 2017). Furthermore, the agriculture labour force is predominantly male in the region, 
for example 58% in Mali (AGRA, 2017). 
Estimating employment shares for Niger and Burkina Faso using FTEs instead of declared 
activity, shows that the share of food agriculture in total food economy employment drops 
significantly, from 91% to 74% and from 87% to 75%, respectively (Allen et al., 2018, p.10). 
While time-related underemployment affects agricultural activities in particular, the share of off-
farm food economy employment in these countries is doubled. For all countries for which data 
are available, including Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, estimated employment shares using FTEs, 
shows a decrease of food agriculture in total food economy employment by 10% (7 percentage 
points), from 75% to 68%. Consequently, the share of off-farm food economy employment in total 
employment increases by 30% (from 25% to 32%) (Allen et al., 2018, p.10). 
Food crops – Food crops that are mainly cultivated in the Sahel region are: maize, millet, rice 
and sorghum (which are the main staple crops). For example, 90% of farmers in Mali produce 
millet, sorghum, maize and rice for subsistence (AGRA, 2017). Some farmers in the region also 
cultivate tubers, cashew, peanuts, legumes, cowpea, sesame and groundnuts, also for 
subsistence. Maize has become an important cereal crop, in particular in rotation with cotton in 
Mali and Burkina Faso. In Mali and Burkina Faso it has surpassed sorghum and millet as the 
main staple crop. Farmers use fertilizers for cotton that are more accessible and affordable on 
the local market for maize (Laris et al, 2015, p.3). For example, Koulibali et al. (2011) found that 
as cotton prices fell, farmers increasingly shifted fertilizer to maize. As a result, the Malian cotton 
trade agency CMDT recently began to provide input loans for fertilizer and herbicides for maize 
as a diversification strategy and to prevent a drop in cotton yields.  
Laris et al. (2015) show that Malian farmers gradually perfected the practice of reallocating 
fertilizers to different crops, they also reduced the practice of growing food crops in long fallow 
rotational agriculture. “The age-old practice of dual production logic remains, but food crop 
production has gradually become more intensive. As such, the older practice of intensively 
farming cash crops and extensively farming food crops has been transformed” (Laris et al., 2015, 
p.11). In the Siby area in Mali, the numbers are quite dramatic; the area under agriculture 
declined by 24% in the period that included devaluation while the amount of area annually 
farmed increased from 28 to 43% (Laris et al., 2015, p.11). In their survey, farmers in Mali argue 
that maize has benefits including producing higher yields per hectare. It can be sold at anytime 
and anyplace, unlike cotton. It matures more rapidly than sorghum and thus serves to shorten 
the hungry season (the period in late summer, when grain stores are low or depleted and the 
new harvest is not yet in). However, with higher market prices for cotton since 2009, cotton 
production is again on the rise.6   
Livestock – Livestock contributes approximately 38% of agricultural GDP and around 15% of 
total GDP in the Sahel region (FEWS NET, 2017). It is also one of the main activities generating 
revenue in these countries’ trade balances as it is the third most important export product for 
most G5 Sahel countries. For example, in Niger 21% of export earnings come from livestock 
sector (FEWS NET, 2017, p.43). Livestock are the most traded products between West African 
countries, which makes it a driving force behind regional economic integration. The sector 
employs approximately 30% of total employment (in case of Mali). The rural population in Mali, 
                                                   
6 See data in https://www.indexmundi.com/agriculture/?country=ml&commodity=cotton&graph=production  
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living in settlements of less than 5,000 inhabitants and involved in livestock farming systems, is 
extremely significant: at 60% of the total population. This share is expected to decrease down to 
40% by 2050 (Ly et al., 2010). The expansion of crop cultivation has increased significantly over 
the last decennia, while the increase of TLUs is less significant (Ickowicz et al., 2012).  
In cotton-growing areas farmers are increasingly integrating animals into their production system. 
These animals are on the move for months and cover long distances. At the same time 
pastoralists’ families tend to settle down without altering their livestock. This partial 
sedentarisation enables these families to have access to healthcare, education, supplies and to 
the country’s political life. By settling most families develop agricultural activities (Inter Reseaux, 
2017, p.7). Agro-pastoralism and agro-breeding highly prevail in this region. For example, in 
Niger, 60% of livestock is owned by agro-breeders and agro-pastoralists in the South (Inter 
Reseaux, 2017, p.4). Agro-pastoral systems provide many things such as the supply of high 
protein foods (milk, meat), manure (for soil fertilisation) and energy (transport, water extraction, 
animal traction). They also produce skin, wool and leather. They therefore supply an entire 
economy and provide a considerable amount of employment in the production chain (Inter 
Reseaux, 2017). 
Fisheries – There are three fish sources in the Sahel: Mauritania’s Atlantic coast, inland river 
systems and lakes. Fish farming is still a small business. Fishing is an important livelihood 
activity in the Sahel, but both inland and coastal fisheries are suffering from overfishing and 
habitat degradation (USAID, 2017, p.4). Inland fishing occurs along all major rivers and lakes of 
the region, including the Niger River (Mali and Niger), the Senegal River (Mali and Mauritania), 
Lake Volta (Burkina Faso), and Lake Chad (Chad and Niger) (USAID, 2017, p.4). The coastal 
and maritime zones of the Sahel are among the richest fishing grounds in the world (UN, 2018, 
p.6). In Mauritania, fisheries account for 10% of GDP and 50% of export earnings (USAID, 2017, 
p.4). Estimates suggest that Mauritania’s fisheries are being exploited at a rate of 30-40% higher 
than the maximum sustainable yield (USAID, 2017, p.4). Its fisheries are exploited by both 
domestic fishermen and foreign fleets (USAID, 2017, p. 4), mainly from EU countries. The EU 
and Mauritania renewed their Fishery Partnership Agreement in 2016 (European Parliament, 
2018). The agreement now allows EU vessels to fish shrimp, tuna, demersal fish and pelagic fish 
totalling up to 281,500 tonnes each year. On its end the EU will pay for the catches, and commit 
€59.125 million every year to the partnership with €4.125 million going into supporting activities 
of the fishing communities in the West African country including environmental sustainability, job 
creation and tackling illegal and unregulated fishing.7  
However, there is criticism that the spill-over effect of the trailer fishing on the coast of Mauritania 
is very small for the local processing industry to add value and create jobs in the sector. The 
argument is that although Mauritania has received over €1 billion in return for EU fishing rights 
for the last 25 years,8 there is little or nothing to show as to how the money is benefiting local 
fishing communities or improving the country’s fishing sector. A Greenpeace report (2012) points 
that the EU’s presence is unsustainable and a hindrance to Africa in developing its own robust 
fishing sector. “The impact on local communities is huge. With less and less fish local fishermen 
are forced to make dangerous journeys further away, some simply give up and move away. 
Trawlers trash traditional fishing gears, which the locals can’t afford to replace. Whilst nominal 
deals may have been done with governments, it is local communities and Africa’s seas that pay 
                                                   
7 See also article on EurActive website on 3 June 2016: https://www.euractiv.com/section/agriculture-
food/news/mauritania-fisheries-deal-receives-mixed-response/  
8 Idem (EurActive: 3 June 2016) 
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the price.” Daniels et al. (2016) write that a ‘crack down’ on illegal fishing by foreign commercial 
fleets operating in western Africa and further investment in the sector could lead to 300,000 new 
jobs. 
Two million people in Chad and neighbouring countries including Niger rely on Lake Chad (World 
Bank, 2015). The fisheries sector around Lake Chad consists of thousands of artisanal fishers 
using fishing gear and boats based on traditional designs. The fishers exploit a wide range of fish 
species within a complex of lake, river, floodplain and swampland environments, of which they 
have a good knowledge and understanding (FAO source).9 Fishing operations form an integral 
part of many household economies, along with farming. A significant proportion of the catch is 
smoked and dried. After processing, fishery products enter a well-organised commercial fish-
marketing chain, which extends to the large urban markets of southern Nigeria, including Lagos, 
Ibadan, Onitsha and Enugu, where dried and smoked fish is in demand by local consumers (FAO 
source).10 In Mali there are on average 80,000 fishermen, as there are sedentary and nomadic 
fishermen, with some peak periods of 225,000 fishermen (WUR source).11 For job creation and 
food security some emphasis is on fish farming and aquaculture in the region, in particular 
related to semi-intensive aquaculture systems near urban areas, integrated extensive systems 
(i.e. rice-fish farming), low-cost breeding programmes that involves local farmers and 
researchers.12 Fish farming benefits mainly women, who, like in Chad smoke the fish and sell it 
on local or regional markets.  
Non-farm employment in food economy 
The three off-farm food economy segments (food marketing, food processing and food-away-
from-home) have a small share in the total food economy employment in Mali and Niger both 
with 9%. It is 13% in Burkina Faso, 15% in Chad and 24% in Mauritania. At the West African 
regional level the average is 22% (Allen et al, 2018, p.10-11). Although the distribution of 
employment in the off-farm segments varies by country, there is a clear pattern which shows that 
food marketing is the largest off-farm segment. In Niger it accounts for just 5% of the total food 
economy employment, in Mali 7%, Burkina Faso 9%, Chad 10% and Mauritania 16% (Allen et 
al., 2018, p.11). Employment patterns in food processing and food-away-from-home (restaurants 
and street food stalls) segments across countries are less significant around 2% for each country 
(with the exception of Mauritania where food processing employment rate is 5%). Together, 
these three non-farm employment in food economy segments account for 31% of total non-farm 
employment in the West African region (Allen et al, 2018, p.10). 
The non-farm employment in food economy relates more to urban areas. With employment in 
food processing in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger respectively 34%, 41% and 40% based in urban 
areas (Allen et al., 2018, p.13). Food marketing is even stronger related to urban areas in these 
countries (46% in Mali and 57% in Burkina Faso) as well as food-away-from-home (81% urban in 
Mali, while 43% in Niger) (Allen et al., 2018, p.13). Because the off-farm segments are more 
related to consumer side and with urban food demand, the development of the off-farm segments 
of the food economy is closely linked to changes in household dietary patterns. These changes, 
related to Bennett’s Law, have recently been documented for West Africa (Allen & Heinrigs, 
                                                   
9 Source FAO: http://www.fao.org/blogs/blue-growth-blog/inland-fisheries-a-new-management-plan-for-lake-
chads-fisheries-sector/en/ 
10 Idem: FAO. 
11 Source PPT presentation WUR University, Wageningen, Netherlands: http://edepot.wur.nl/300320  
12 Idem: WUR University. 
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2016; Staatz & Hollinger, 2016) and show that, with rising income and urbanisation, consumption 
of fresh and perishable products, such as fruits and vegetables, dairy, meats, and processed 
foods, increases rapidly.13 Perishable and processed foods demand more value added after the 
farm in terms of cold chains, processing and packaging. The employment effect of these food 
demand transformations is that work moves increasingly into the off-farm segments of the food 
system. In addition, the growth in food marketing activities is closely linked to the development of 
food markets, although these markets are less developed in the G5 Sahel countries in 
comparison with some other sub-Saharan African countries such as Ghana, Nigeria or Kenya 
(Allen et al., 2018). 
Food processing - The food processing sector is the largest manufacturing sub-sector in terms 
of employment in the region. Although it accounts for just a very small amount of food economy 
employment, it represents in Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali (the countries of which data is 
available) over 30% of total secondary sector employment. In Niger it is the highest with 50%, 
followed by Burkina Faso 38% and Mali 32% (Allen et al., 2018, p.11). Many of these jobs are in 
artisanal and small- and medium-sized enterprises in the informal economy, however, looking to 
formal employment, food manufacturing stands out as the most important contributor to value 
added and a contributor of significance to employment (Hebous & Tran, 2017). With the potential 
to generate more formal jobs as food markets are created and agriculture productivity increases. 
Looking at the food processing sector from a jobs perspective, there are four important features, 
related to West Africa (including Sahel):  
 Agro-industries (e.g. millers, beer breweries, processors) are more likely than other 
industry sectors to locate outside primary cities including in small towns and more rural 
areas (Christiaensen & Lawin, 2017).  
 Food processing creates strong forward and backward linkages with other food and non-
food system activities. The food processing sector is a growing outlet for agricultural 
products, which generally translates into more stable demand (Allen et al., 2018).  
 Employment in the processing sector is dominated by women and tends to be unskilled 
and labour intensive, providing more inclusive opportunities (Allen et al., 2018).  
 Demand for food processing activities is projected to continue to grow over the medium-
term mainly driven by urbanisation (IFPRI, 2017). However, if this growth is concentrated 
in large-scale industrial processors, this will have a different impact. The literature shows 
that an unreliable supply of local raw materials of consistent quality (mainly the case in 
the Sahel), will automatically result in an over-reliance on imported commodity inputs for 
large-scale industrial processors (Staatz & Hollinger, 2016). Hence, from an employment 
perspective, growth in food processing sector will crucially depend on the capacity of 
local processors and agri-businesses to source from domestic production (Staatz & 
Hollinger, 2016).  
Food marketing – Food marketing is the largest off-farm segment, accounting for more than 
70% of all non-agricultural food economy jobs. Food marketing jobs (transport, storage, 
wholesale, retail) represent 27% of all service sector employment in West Africa (Allen et al., 
2018, p.11-13). The development of these activities is closely linked to urbanisation and the 
                                                   
13 See also K4D Helpdesk report “Urban Food Systems” (Tull, K., 2018) that was the input report for the thematic 
session on Urbanisation, Nutrtion and Purchased Food organised in the Learning Journey on Changing Food 
Systems. http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/123456789/14032.  
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reliance on markets for gaining access to food. However, not only urban food markets are 
important for job creation as rural households rely increasingly on markets to access foods. In 
Burkina Faso, rural households spend more than 60% of their food budget at markets, of which 
36% is spent on processed foods (Allen et al., 2018, p.12). Also, changes in food demand and 
reductions in transport costs increase demand for foods produced further away (Tacoli & 
Agergaard, 2017), creating job opportunities in non-farm food economy. The more urbanised a 
country (e.g. Mauritania), the higher their shares of total food employment in marketing activities. 
However, Mali and Niger are among the least urbanised countries in the region, and they have 
the lowest total food employment in marketing activities (respectively 7% and 5%) (Allen et al., 
2018, p.11). Like food processing, food marketing activities will continue to grow due to 
urbanisation and dietary changes in demand, which will keep the segment as the largest number 
of off-farm food jobs in the years to come.  
Food-away-from-home - Food-away-from-home accounts for 2% of all food jobs and 10% of 
off-farm food jobs in West Africa and the percentage is much smaller in the Sahel countries: in 
Mali, this segment counts for 0% and Niger 1% to the total food economy employment (Allen et 
al., 2018, p.11). The main factor behind this is the small urbanisation rate, while the segment in 
the food economy becomes more important with further development of food markets, changing 
working conditions (e.g. commuting) people in urban areas (including the poor, who have to eat 
more often food away from home) (IFPRI, 2017). Differences that could explain who eats more 
away are cultural factors, but also differences in city size and configuration, transport network 
and working hours. Food-away-from-home is closely associated with incomes and is projected to 
grow faster than other food segments if economies grow and urbanisation rates continue to 
increase (Staatz & Hollinger, 2016). In addition, the sector is highly important for women’s 
employment (for Niger see: Otoo et al., 2012) and generates high value added, also on imported 
products. It also creates strong linkages with other food sources providing regular demand for 
other food economy activities (Tschirley et. al., 2016).  
4. Employment in non-food agriculture 
Cotton sector  
The cultivation of cotton in Mali, Burkina Faso and to a lesser extent in Chad, is a significant 
contributor to GDP, trade balance (through export) and employment (Baquedano et al., 2010). 
Cotton farming is done primarily by smallholders in the region, and remains extremely labour 
intensive with no mechanisation, and is the farmers’ main cash crop. In Burkina Faso and Mali 
the production of cotton is for 66% in hands of poor or nearly poor farmer households (ILO, 2016, 
p.4). Burkina Faso has the highest hectares in cotton cultivation in the region (850,000 hectares 
in 2017/18 and 1.4 million 480 lb bales).14 The average farm size in Burkina Faso is 3.9 hectares 
and according to the FAO 4 million Burkinabes (22% of the population) support themselves 
through activities connected to the cotton sector. The cotton productivity in Burkina Faso was for 
a long time higher than in Mali and did not see a major dip in productivity in the 1990s (see for 
Mali below). It is the main export product after gold; 98% of the cotton is exported (USDA GAIN, 
2018). Cotton seed is processed into oil and delinted seeds. Burkina Faso has 150 cotton seed 
oil factories, but only 80 comply with CODEX guidelines. Burkina Faso has only one spinning 
mill, FILSAH, which produces 5,000 MT of yarn per year (USDA GAIN, 2018). High production 
                                                   
14 See: https://www.indexmundi.com/agriculture/?country=bf&commodity=cotton&graph=production  
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costs and electricity shortages are the biggest challenges to expanding domestic yarn 
production. 40% of this yarn is sold locally to produce artisanal products; 60% is exported to 
European markets (e.g., Rotterdam, Barcelona, and Hamburg) (USDA GAIN, 2018). In February, 
2018, media sources reported that Burkina Faso plans to open a new textile mill worth 220 billion 
CFA francs (US$366 million).15  
In Mali 740,000 hectares were planted with cotton in 2017/18 with production of 1.3 million 480 lb 
bales.16 98% of the cotton is exported, the remaining 2% remains in country for processing into 
artisanal weaving yarns (unbleached, white, and dyed thread) and printed fabrics (bogolan 
fabrics, woven cloth, and woven koba). According to Tefft (2010) cotton is Mali’s number two 
export earner after gold (80% of export earning for gold and cotton combined) and contributes 
15% of government revenues as well as 8% of GDP. Cotton is thus critical to the national 
economy as well as many local livelihoods. Cotton was the driver of successful agricultural 
development during the 20 years following Mali’s independence in 1960. Cotton farmers were 
supported by research, extension services, and input credit resulting in substantially increased 
incomes and agricultural productivity. As a result, cotton yields more than tripled by the early 
1980s (Baquedano et al., 2010). Following a steady rise over several decades, however, cotton 
yields began to decline during the 1990s, however, it has stabilised since 2008 around 800 kg/ha 
and recently increased to nearly 1,000 kg/ha (Dembele, 2017, p.1558). Benjaminsen (2010) 
suggested that devaluation of the West African currency in 1994 drove up the cost of inputs 
resulting in a rapid expansion in cotton growing as farmers attempted to maximise profits. His 
argument is that Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) reduced the subsidies on fertilizers 
resulting in a price increase and subsequent lower fertilizer use which pushed farmers to 
increase acreage to compensate for lower yields. Since the downfall in 2008-2009 (international 
market crisis, high price of cotton inputs and low farm gate price of cotton per kilogramme), the 
number of farm households working in cotton is rising again and production is rising to a record 
level of 725,000 tonnes in 2017/18,17 helped with better prices and improving international 
markets. There are now around 130,000 farm households involved in the cotton production in 
Mali (Dembele, 2017, p.1559), an increase of 40,000 between 2009 and 2015. 
In Chad the cotton sector is in decline. The expectation is that producers will decide to grow 
other crops or find off-farm employment since COTONTCHAD, the national ginning mill 
company, has been financially unstable and unable to fulfil its contracts and distribute inputs. 
2018/19 cotton production is forecast to decrease 6% from the previous season area and is now 
estimated at 110,000 hectares (USDA GAIN, 2018).  
Expectations for 2018/19 cotton production in the Sahel is good according to the 2018 USDA 
GAIN report. However, the forecast is that the total area for Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and 
Senegal is projected to decrease to 1.67 million hectares due to the possibility of limited credit 
and inputs due to the problems in Burkina Faso and Chad. Many Burkina Faso cottons farmers 
are reportedly in default and unable to pay loans for the last crop season due to low production, 
which may bar them from accessing financing. 2018/19 total cotton production for all the 
aforementioned countries is estimated to rise 4% to 2.86 million metric tons on expectations of 
                                                   
15 The project is supported by the Government of Burkina Faso and several financial partners (i.e., Afreximbank, 
the African Development Bank, Bank of Africa, Ecobank and Lilium Capital). It will be led by the Turkish company 
Ayka Textile which also invested in Ethiopia’s largest textile mill. Since reliable energy is a major constraint, a 35-
MW coal-fired power plant reportedly will be built next to the new mill, which is expected to be operational by 
July, 2018 (source: USDA, GAIN, 2018). 
16 https://www.indexmundi.com/agriculture/?country=ml&commodity=cotton&graph=production  
17 Idem: Index Mundi. 
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strong prices, good weather, and better pest management. Total exports are expected to 
increase 3% on higher exportable supplies and strong international demand (USDA GAIN, 2018). 
Burkina Faso and Mali are respectively the number 6 and 7 exporters of cotton in the world, with 
the main destination Bangladesh (ILO, 2016, p.2). For Chad cotton is the fourth export product, 
counting for 1.7% of total export earnings. 
Common themes that emerge across all three countries, include (Usher et al., 2013, p.3):  
 Status of women: In each country, women play an important role in the cultivation of 
cotton; however, women face serious structural gender bias in the sector. Key challenges 
include: occupational segregation, women’s unequal access to property title and finance, 
wage discrimination, women’s reproductive health risks associated with pesticide 
exposure and a lack of voice within household structures, field work and producer 
organisations.  
 Child labour: Child labour can be found in cotton production in all three countries, 
although the scale of the issue varies between countries. In all three countries, one of the 
most pressing challenges is to reduce children’s exposure to hazardous working 
conditions, including pesticide application and use of sharp tools. For example, in 2011 
there was a widely publicised exposé of child labour found in fair trade and organic cotton 
producing in farms Burkina Faso sourced by Victoria’s Secret which testifies to the 
ongoing difficulties of monitoring compliance (ILO, 2016, p.25).18 
 Wages and incomes: Work in cotton production tends to be characterised by low 
income and economic insecurity. In all three countries, it is estimated that average 
incomes for households are very close to (and sometimes below) the World Bank’s 
extreme poverty line. Waged workers often receive wages below legal minima. Low 
productivity (caused by lack of knowledge and/or access to credit) is a major barrier to 
improving incomes. Wages are a pivotal concern for cotton workers, who are often 
amongst the most vulnerable members of (often already vulnerable) cotton producing 
communities, yet this is not expressly addressed by the BCI Production Criterion on 
decent work for smallholders (whereas wage criteria do exist for medium and large-sized 
farms) (Usher et al., 2013). Wages for hired labour on smallholdings also interact closely 
with risks associated with involuntary labour, and have important implications for 
livelihoods. Improvement is needed on wages in smallholder farming that could address 
key issues such as: timeliness and frequency of payments, records of (substantial) wage 
advances, in-kind payments and links between wages, profitability and productivity. 
 Health and safety: One of the major health and safety risks in cotton production across 
all three countries is exposure to hazardous chemicals, as a result of the lack of use of 
personal protective equipment (PPE) when applying pesticides. This has particularly 
serious health implications for women and children.  
 Forced or bonded labour: Forced or bonded labour is present in cotton production in all 
three countries, although its prevalence is difficult to pinpoint with any accuracy given 
that, by its nature, it is mostly a hidden phenomenon. 
                                                   
18 ‘Victoria’s Secret revealed in child picking Burkina Faso cotton,’ Cam Simpson, December 15, 2011, 
Bloomberg Markets at: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-12-15/victoria-s-secret-revealed-in-child-
picking-burkina-faso-cotton.  
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Shea nuts  
Some nuts are used in non-food processing, like the shea nut of which the oil is extracted from 
its kernels and used nationally and internationally in cosmetics and pharmaceutics. The 
processing and sales represent significant income earning opportunities for rural women who are 
the main stakeholders in the production chain (Bup Nde et al., 2014, p.5). Shea nuts and its 
products are listed among the top non-traditional exports in countries in West-Africa, including 
the Sahel region. In Burkina Faso, it is one of the main export products and it makes a 
contribution of about US$6 million to the national economy. Mali and Burkina Faso are among 
the countries classified as in the high production zone (potentials of producing 70,000–300,000 
tons per year), while Chad is classified among countries with average production zone (potentials 
of 10,000–70,000 tons per year), and Niger as low production zone (less than 10,000 tons a 
year) - no information is available for Mauritania (Bup Nde et al., 2014, p.2). Though semi 
mechanised and some fully mechanised productions methods are employed in the major shea 
producing countries of the Sahel, most of the rural women use traditional processing procedures. 
Major importers of shea are the European Union, Japan and the USA. One of the main 
challenges is to protect the trees from burning and exploitation for wood and charcoal production 
(Bup Nde et al., 2014, p.1).  
The international value chain of shea is relatively new. Burkina Faso and Mali are amongst the 
leading export countries of shea products. In Burkina Faso, the value of shea nut exports 
increased threefold during 2000-2005 and sevenfold during 2005-2012 (Rousseau et al., 2015, 
p.413). In the shea nut value chain in Burkina Faso, market globalisation has had only a weak 
impact on the restructuring of the regional supply chain despite the boom in the shea trade and 
the arrival of leading foreign firms. “The main impact of globalisation of the shea nut value chain 
has been on prices and volumes. The quality standard, organisation, and governance of the 
value chain have barely been affected” (Rousseau et al., 2015, p.413). In 2000 the export was 
mainly raw shea nuts (95%), while in 2010 the export of shea butter from the region had 
increased to 35% (Rousseau et al., 2015, p.415). The processing creates jobs, mainly for rural 
women in Mali and Burkina Faso. They increasingly organise themselves in women groups and 
cooperatives, with support from NGOs, to avoid being dependent on middlemen and traders 
(Sibide et al., 2012). However, a study in Burkina Faso found that 94% of the women sampled 
were involved solely in the collection of shea nuts, and 59% in the commercialisation process 
(Pouliot, 2012), which shows that women’s participation in the more profitable parts of the shea 
value chain is still limited.   
A more recent study of Chen (2017) also in Burkina Faso shows that the shea sector contributes 
to women’s economic well-being with 33% of the women involved making less than CFA 100,000 
(US$171) per year, 50% earn less than CFA 200,000 (US$342) per year and 25% earn more 
than CFA 480,000 (US$821) per year. The women involved in all stages of shea butter 
production (not only nut collection and nut processing, but also transformation into butter) earn 
on average much more than only collector. Chen (2017) concludes that through empowerment of 
women in shea value chains women are increasingly involved in higher profitable aspects. These 
actors are present in all areas of the value chain. They lead within the collection and also 
transform shea nuts into products such as shea butter, soap and pomade. This group accounted 
for 42% of the total sample. However, in her sample 50% of men were positioned in the role as 
leaders of their groups; they earned 44 times the income of women leaders because only men 
occupy the more profitable sections of the value chain: half controlled all aspects of shea 
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production, and half were traders of shea nuts or derivatives. Only 23.8% of women received an 
income solely from shea (Chen, 2017, p.X).  
5. Employment in extractive sector and manufacturing 
Extractive sector  
The literature on employment and modern large-scale mining shows that it does not employ 
many workers. It has historically been capital-intensive, and this feature increased with 
technological progress (Chuhan-Pole et al., 2017). “At the country level, this magnifies the extent 
of the windfalls through exports and central government revenue, but it may also lower the 
amount of value added paid to indigenous factors, mainly labour” (Chuhan-Pole et al., 2017, 
p.71). Thus, extractive industries, like oil and gas industry or mining industry, could be 
characterised of being cut off from the domestic economy except through royalties and taxes. 
Partly in response to criticism that employment in mines is low, mining companies and chambers 
of mines argue that although globally small, the number employed is locally significant and can 
raise average incomes and expenditures in the vicinity of a mine. It is also argued that mines are 
linked to local industry through the use of inputs of other goods and services, and that 
employment is stimulated through these backward linkages (Chuhan-Pole et al., 2017). Despite 
the risks that mines pose to agricultural productivity (for example, through environmental 
pollution or structural shifts in the labour market), there is no evidence in literature (including Mali 
and Burkina Faso) of a decrease of agricultural production in mining districts (Chuhan-Pole et al., 
2017, p.166). 
Gold mining in Burkina Faso and Mali - Mali’s gold production represents 95% of the country’s 
mineral production (Antil, 2014, p.13). The mining industry officially employs 3,700 people in 
Mali, mainly in gold mining – an amount that over the years has not very much changed 
(Chuhan-Pole et al., 2017, p.73). For Mali, Sanoh & Coulibaly (2015) report a ratio of 14 national 
workers to each expatriate, and that on average 78% of jobs are held by people working in mines 
located in three communes (local government entities): Gouandiaka, Sadiola, and Sitakily. 
Employees of mining firms in Mali earn US$1,200 a month on average. National labour survey 
data suggest that the mean income from mining is higher than the average income for all other 
economic activities, and considerably so when compared with agriculture or industry. The study 
also shows that for every one mining job created, 1.67 jobs are created elsewhere through 
backward linkages and expenditure effects (Sanoh & Coulibaly, 2015). In other words, the 
multiplier effects are limited, partly because of the capital intensity of the mining industry, but 
mostly because of the lack of local cost-effective procurement opportunities (Chuhan-Pole, 2017, 
p.72). This could change over time, as mining companies become better acquainted with local 
markets and suppliers, and as local entrepreneurs learn to take advantage of the new 
opportunities arising from the expansion of mining activity. However, even where local 
procurement is stimulated, including in services such as catering, vehicle repair, machine shop 
services, welding, metal work, electrical work, and plumbing, the proportion of inputs sourced 
locally remains low (Chuhan-Pole, 2017, p.72).  
The Malian government is keen to unlock the economic potential of other resources, such as 
bauxite, manganese, lithium and uranium. In April 2017, the Chamber of Mines announced that 
following several new discoveries, bauxite reserves in Mali's Falea project are now estimated at 
1.63 billion tonnes (Bt), which is equivalent to 572t of refined aluminium (Vella, 2017). A spate of 
investment deals signed with China, totalling about $11bn, aims to unlock the potential of other 
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minerals. BMI Research forecasts that Mali’s mining industry will experience a value growth of 
10% from 2017 to 2021, putting it above top African mining markets, such as the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) (Vella, 2017). 
Burkina Faso’s gold mining sector is like Mali the biggest contributor to export earnings and with 
few linkages to other productive markets. Research results (Zabsonré et al., 2016) suggest that 
areas hosting gold extraction have better average living standards in terms of headcount ratios, 
poverty gaps and household expenditures than their counterparts without gold. Although the 
effects are not statistically significant on inequality, it is robustly positive. Before 2006, the gold 
mining sector was dominated by artisanal and small-scale gold mining, and the contribution of 
the sector to the national revenue was not substantial (Zabsonré et al., 2016, p.6). However, 
since 2007 the government has initiated reforms to increase revenue from gold production for 
poverty reduction. From 2007 to 2010 seven gold mining companies came into operation and 
gold production has been multiplied by eight-fold (Zabsonré et al., 2016, p.6). More than 600 
permits are currently assigned. In relation to gold mining, these include permits issued to the 
Canadian companies High River Gold Mines Ltd., IAMGOLD Corp. and Semafo Inc., the British 
companies Avocet Mining plc and Cluff Gold plc and another company, Mining Corp., based in 
the British West Indies. Volta Resources Inc (Canada) meanwhile is mining for copper and gold 
in the Gaoua region since its start in 2014 (Antil, 2014, p.17). Burkina Faso also has large 
phosphate and manganese deposits (Antil, 2014, p.17). EITI report (2009) drawn up by KPGM 
has also pointed out the existence of nickel, iron, graphite, lead, pyrites and antimony. 
Artisanal mining is still a very important sector in Mali and Burkina Faso. Exact numbers of 
employment could not be found in the literature (IMF, 2018, states that “the direct employment 
effects of large-scale mining are limited, but artisanal mining employment has increased in recent 
years”, regarding Mali), however, the downside is that artisanal mining counts for at least 20,000 
children worked in Malian artisanal gold mines under extremely harsh and dangerous conditions 
(Human Right Watch, 2011) and that the uncontrolled use of chemicals has also had a negative 
effect on the environment. The findings are backed up by a 2017 Partnership African Canada 
(PAC) report, which states that the lack of government presence, institutional structure and policy 
coherence undermine the ability to plan, capture and reap the sector’s full economic benefits and 
breeds child labour and environmental destruction. 
Inclusive growth from extractive industry, thus, depends not on direct and indirect employment, 
but on the extent to which their output can be used to stimulate overall growth that benefits other 
sectors of economy, and the establishment of the necessary institutional capacity for resource 
management and enforcement of regulations in the extractive industries (Evoh, 2017, p.67). 
Plus, regulation, enforcement and formalisation trajectories to artisanal mining activities. 
The mining economy of Mauritania – Antil (2014) labels Mauritania as the country in the region 
where the economy is most likely to be transformed rapidly into a real mining economy. Mining 
production has existed in Mauritania since the 1960s. It extracts iron, copper and gold, but also 
phosphate, cobalt, uranium, rare earths, coal, diamonds, manganese and fluorspar. Mauritania 
has vast mineral wealth including iron and copper, which it has been exploiting since the 1960s 
(Antil, 2014, p. 16). The Société minière de Mauritanie (SNIM) has its roots in mining pre-
independence: after independence it was nationalised and became the flagship of the 
Mauritanian economy (Antil, 2014, p. 16). SNIM is the largest private employer in the country 
producing more than 10 million tonnes of iron a year: the state owns a 78.35% share of the 
company (Antil, 2014, p. 16). SNIM in partnership with Xtrate (one of the largest mining 
companies in the world) plans to produce 50 million tonnes of iron a year at three sites (Antil, 
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2014, p. 16). SNIM is also undertaking a joint venture with the Industrial Bank of Kuwait to mine 
gypsum (Antil, 2014, p. 17). Exploitation of Mauritania’s natural gas could supply electricity to the 
mining sector and be exported to Senegal and Mali (Antil, 2014, p. 17). The World Bank is 
working with Mauritania to design a robust fiscal framework to manage the revenues from the 
development of offshore gas (IMF, 2018). However, there are a number of problems in the 
mining sector, which could limit its potential including corruption, poor governance and low 
wages (Antil, 2014, pp. 24-25).  
Uranium mining in Niger – Niger is the world’s fourth largest producer of uranium. Uranium 
represented 70.8% of Niger’s total exports in 2010 (Antil, 2014, p.15). Yet its contribution to the 
country’s GDP only rose to 5.8% that same year. Investments are therefore focused mainly on 
research and mining uranium and gold. Uranium is the substance most in demand: in 2007 it 
accounted for 76% of all permits issued for research and production together; gold occupies 
second position with 19%; other substances, which include coal, account for 5% of the remaining 
permits (Antil, 2014, p.15). The French company Areva was the first to mine uranium in Niger, 
but the country opened up its uranium mining to new companies. The main ones are Homeland 
Uranium Inc. (a branch of the Canadian company, Homeland Energy Group), which holds eight 
concessions for exploration, and the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) via its Sonima 
branch, which has been running the uranium mine at Azelik and has been in production since 
2010. Production is due to reach 1,000 tonnes a year in the long term (Antil, 2014, p.16). 
The mining sector in Niger also involves gold, phosphate and coal (Larsen & Mamosso, 2014, p. 
65). As of 2012, 40 mining corporations were registered in Niger and the government had plans 
to double exports from mining by 2016 (Larsen & Mamosso, 2014, p. 66). Oil production began in 
2011, with operations governed by a production-sharing agreement between the government and 
the China National Petroleum Company (Sangare & Maisonnave, 2018). The Agadem oil field is 
linked to the Zinder refinery by a pipeline and there are plans to export large amounts of oil 
through a pipeline via Chad (Sangare & Maisonnave, 2018, p. 581). Because the large-scale 
mining industry has very few job opportunities, small-scale mining activities have increased in 
Niger, in particular creating informal jobs for youth men.19 
Oil production in Chad – Chad ranks as the tenth-largest oil reserve holder among African 
countries, with 1.5 billion barrels of proven reserves as of January 1, 2013 (US Export Agency 
website).20 The government depends heavily on petroleum for its public revenue as it contributes 
60% to the national budget (US Export Agency). Chad’s petroleum exports are produced 
primarily by the Esso Exploration & Production Chad Inc. (EEPCI) consortium and the China 
National Petroleum Company in Chad (CNPCIC). The Esso consortium began extracting oil from 
southern Chad in 2003. The 1,100 kilometres Chad-Cameroon pipeline carries Chadian oil 
exports through Cameroon to the port of Douala. In 2016, Canadian, British, Taiwanese, 
Russian, and Nigerian companies owned oil blocks and exploration rights and work towards 
exporting oil from their respective fields via the consortium’s Chad-Cameroon pipeline. A joint 
venture between the Government of Chad’s state-owned oil company, Societé des 
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Hydrocarbures du Tchad (SHT), and the CNPCIC refines petroleum for export and domestic 
consumption at a 20,000 barrel per day refinery 40 km outside N’Djamena.21 
Recent IMF country reviews show the impact that contractions in oil production due to technical 
problems and lower oil prices since 2014 had on public spending (IMF, 2018).22 Before 2014 oil 
export revenues were higher than the value of total imports, but since then the oil export 
revenues were not enough to pay for the imports (IMF, 2018). While oil revenues decreased, its 
external debt service burden increased significantly, primarily to Glencore, a commodities trading 
firm that provided Chad oil-backed loans in 2013 and 2014 against future oil exports. This led to 
a severe contraction in public spending in 2015–16. The spending stabilised in 2017 and 2018, 
however, the income per capita, which peaked at US$1,239 in 2014, fell to US$810 in 2017 (IMF, 
2018). Non-oil activity was also weak and negatively affected by the accumulation of domestic 
arrears, spillovers from the oil sector on non-oil activity are estimated to have been limited given 
that government spending (the engine of the nonoil sector) was in 2017 moderately affected by 
lower oil revenue.  
The impact of the crisis on employment in the sector is huge: employment in industry (% of total 
employment) in Chad was reported at 4.9% in 2017 down from nearly 7% in 2014 and 8% in 
2002, according to the World Bank and ILO data.23 There are opportunities for the country to 
develop its extractive sector further. Chad’s mining sector is underdeveloped and the country’s 
mineral resources are under-explored. The only mineral currently exported from Chad is sodium 
carbonate, also known as natron. According to a 2010 geologic survey by the Government of 
Chad, Chad may contain deposits of gold, silver, diamonds, quartz, bauxite, granite, tin, 
tungsten, uranium, limestone, sand, gravel, kaolin, and salt (US Export Agency website). The 
Government of Chad is in the process of rewriting the mining code. Chad’s natural gas sector is 
also largely underdeveloped. Less than 1% of Chad’s 999.5 billion cubic meters of proven natural 
gas reserves are exploited for domestic consumption, Chad is not an exporter of natural gas (US 
Export Agency website). 
Although there is no specific data or research on the exact impact on employment of the 
extractive sector for Chad, by looking at the literature from other countries in the region (Antil, 
2014; Sanoh & Coulibaly, 2015; Chuhan-Pole, 2017), the direct and indirect impact of the sector 
on employment will be small (for example in exploration, jobs could be created in geological 
surveying, maintenance of oil facilities, oil drilling rigs and accessories, pipeline maintenance, 
security, trucks drivers and cranes, etc.), but there is a skills gap for local communities to benefit 
from such job creation.  
Manufacturing 
The secondary sector (Industry) is dominated by the extractive industry in the region. 
Manufacturing and construction are industries that are underdeveloped. Manufacturing is in 
many countries in decline as they cannot compete on the international level. No literature could 
be found on the exact employment in the sector, however, what is known is that manufacturing is 
mainly related to the agro-pastoral sector by processing food (crops, seed oils, fish and livestock) 
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and non-food agricultural products (cotton and shea nuts). As was written above in this report, 
50% of the employment in the secondary sector relates to the processing of food in Niger, 38% in 
Burkina Faso and 32% in Mali (Allen et al., 2018). The manufacturing in Niger counts for 6% of 
GDP in 2016.24 In Niger a particular emphasis is given to transformation and the industrial 
development of high-potential agro-pastoral products. Numerous actions have been carried out 
at an institutional level to promote industrial development, like the creation of the AN2PI (National 
Agency for the Promotion of Innovation and Industrial Property). In Burkina Faso manufacturing 
accounted for 6.6% of GDP in 2015 and the share of manufactured goods in total export of 
goods was in 2014 10.4% (IMF, 2018b, p.10). The share in GDP of manufacturing in Chad fell in 
2002 from 9.1% to 0.2% in 2005. However, this was mainly due to the start of petroleum 
production in Chad in 2003. The sector recovered and counts for 3.2% of GDP in 2016. 
In Mali the trend of de-industrialisation is the sharpest of all countries as its manufactures were 
competitive only on their local market where protection offsets a fundamental lack of comparative 
advantage. Since regional integration and trade liberalisation took off it constituted a major 
challenge. The numbers show that Mali’s manufacturing sector has steadily contracted as a 
share of output as percentage of GDP (from 12% in 1995 to 7% in 2013) while it remained flat in 
most other countries in West Africa (IMF, 2015). On the other hand the share of output of 
agriculture remained stable, while in other countries in the West African region its share had 
declined (IMF, 2015). This could be one of the reason behind the decline of the share of industry 
employment since 2004 in Mali while the share of agricultural employment in Mali increased. For 
Mauritania manufacturing is mainly in the fish processing industry, and other small food related 
processing industries (IMF, 2017). 
6. Employment in services  
Employment in the service sector remains the same or is increasing gradually over the years in 
the Sahel countries, (World Bank data website for 2016). However, no significant recent literature 
could be found that could explain the distribution of employment within the service sector, for 
both the private and public sectors. The IMF (2016) shows for Burkina Faso that the government 
wage bill has increased rapidly since 2000, reflecting a large expansion in government 
employment. 1.7% of the working-age population in Burkina Faso works in public sector, 
increasing steadily from 0.9% in 2000 (IMF, 2016, p.14). Public employment growth has 
averaged 7% per year in recent history (IMF, 2016, p.14). Public employment growth in Burkina 
Faso was more pronounced in the education and security sectors, and amongst mid-level civil 
servants. The secondary and higher education sector grew fastest, followed by primary 
education and security services. Public employment growth was strongest amongst mid-level 
and managerial categories, and in particular amongst contractual workers, which accounted for 
virtually all change in public employment between 2010 and 2014 (IMF, 2016, p.17). Such 
detailed recent data on public sector workers could not be found for any of the other countries. 
However, no further detailed data on workers in education, health care and other sectors in 
public sector could be found in the timespan of this report. 
                                                   




Data on job distribution in the private service sector, mainly in marketing, transport, finance, 
telecommunication and tourism, is also sparse. One source mentioned that approximately 8,700 
people work in the tourism industry in Niger (High Investment Council Niger, 2017, p.15). From 
Allen et al. (2018) and Antil (2014) it could be suggested that the private service sector activities 
are linked to agri-food, cotton and extractive industries.  
7. Drivers for more formal and productive jobs 
Employment creation in the formal economy has not kept pace in the Sahel, like in many other 
sub-Saharan African countries. Even under the most favourable projections, only about a quarter 
of the people newly entering the labour force will find wage employment in the formal economy 
(Fox, 2014). Agriculture and the informal economy (most of which has important forward and 
backward linkages with agriculture) will need to absorb a large share of these new workers into 
remunerative work otherwise the region will experience escalating economic, social and political 
challenges associated with youth unemployment. 
Creating productive jobs in the formal sector can be done with two strategies (Rodrik, 2015):25 
 Helping small businesses grow, via commercialisation pathways out of the informal 
sector.  
 Supporting modern companies in formal sector to expand and be more inclusive.  
No literature was found on the specific drivers for job creation in the Sahel. The drivers behind 
job creation that could contribute to both these strategies’ success and mentioned below, were 
derived from many other resources in development economics. Drivers that will be examined in 
more details are trade openness (for the Sahel in particular for regional trade as landlocked 
countries), investments (private and public investments), value chain or cluster development for 
(future) competitive sectors, green economy (in particular in renewable energy), education and 
innovation, entrepreneurship, remittances from migrants, and urbanisation (higher domestic 
demand within a small economy as the Sahel). These drivers need good governance, good 
(investment) management skills in public and private sector, and human security, stability and 
conflict prevention. Some limitations for these drivers with evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa has 
been included, although not always specified for the Sahel due to lack of evidence from the G5 
Sahel countries. 
Trade openness  
For developing countries the export market is the main source of industrial growth, which 
generates higher productivity and jobs in the formal sector. However, manufactured exports 
measured per capita in the Sahel countries is far below the average for low income countries. To 
increase manufacturing exports, the countries must open their trade and improve their trans-
border infrastructure. Regional trade in particular provides possibilities to create jobs by reaching 
into markets with higher demand than in the small Sahel countries. Not only with other West-
African countries, like with Nigeria (for Niger), Ivory Coast (for Mali), Ghana (for Burkina Faso), 
but also by looking at the Maghreb. One of the most developed trans-border trade is the livestock 
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and meat industry between countries, for example, between Niger and Nigeria and Mali and 
Ghana. However, as Laurent Bossard, director of the Sahel and West-Africa Club (SWAC) 
secretariat, explains in an interview with The Broker: “The meat industry, for example, could be a 
starting point for removing trade barriers between Sahelian and Maghreb countries. Mali is a land 
of cattle, while Algeria is short on cattle.”26 The current problem, according to Bossard, is that 
trade in cattle is restricted and only processed meat can cross the border to Algeria. To turn this 
problem in an opportunity creates jobs in meat processing, storage and transport. 
One study shows the importance of social networks to succeed in trans-border businesses as it 
shows that the overall economic performance of small traders is not affected by their education, 
though, greatly affected by the size and the nature of their network (Kuepie et al., 2014). Being in 
active relationship with one additional prominent figure increases profits by 50%. While social ties 
with local religious leaders have a negative effect on the business profit, relationship with civil 
servants, politicians, and, security officers, is translated into economic performance (Kuepie et 
al., 2014). Social connections developed with state representatives had a much greater effect on 
economic performances of the poorer countries, like Niger (Kuepie et al., 2014). Traders show a 
great ability to invest in commercial networks and routes, concludes also Walther et al. (2015). 
Drawing upon kinship, ethnic and religious ties, their embedded business networks still help to 
reduce business risks, pool complementary skills, improve access to new markets and safeguard 
property rights. In an uncertain environment such as the Sahel, traders tend to avoid large fixed 
investments and prefer spreading their business over different places, often by maintaining an 
extensive network of kin or clients in different cities (Walther, 2014). Mobile traders in much of 
contemporary West Africa concentrate on mastering the distance between places rather than 
investing heavily into territories of production organised around a central place (Walther et al., 
2015). 
The literature also makes a link between food security and regional trade in West-Africa (Lange 
et al., 2016; World Bank, 2015). The reasoning is that if West-Africa’s total and urban population 
will continue to grow, and if global competition for food available on the world market will become 
tenser, regions like West Africa (including G5 Sahel) should put emphasis on feeding the own 
population as much as possible (Lange et al., 2016). Regional food trade could create jobs in 
regional food systems in input markets, food markets, financial markets and food production 
(Roquefeuil et al., 2014; Arawomo & Badejo, 2015, World Bank, 2015a).  
Women represent nearly 60% of informal traders in the region (Koroma et al., 2017, p.XI). “It is 
mainly practiced by the unemployed, small and medium enterprises and some large firms, and 
even formal worker desiring to supplement their salaries. As such, there is considerable overlap 
between informality and formality given the linkages between the two and the fact that there are 
formal firms which engage in informal trade and there are informal traders who are suppliers of 
the formal firms” (Koroma et al., 2017, p.XI). Koroma et al., hence, conclude that trans-border 
trade presents unique benefits to those engaging in such activities, like employment creation. A 
substantial proportion of informal cross-border trade is related to staple food commodities (e.g. 
maize, rice and cattle) and low-quality consumer goods (e.g. clothes, shoes and electronic 
appliances) (OECD, 2009). Yusuff (2015), for example, specifically investigates women traders 
engaging in informal trade in order to make a living from their very small, informal enterprises. 
Along the trade corridor informal trade of products but also services (like people in low-skill 




border-related services such as taxis and porterage, travel worker) takes place, posing threats to 
those engaged in it, but also brings possibilities of income-generation (Yusuff, 2015). 
Improving formal cross-border trade in the region and formalising informal trade (see for 
interventions on formalising trade in Africa, Koroma et al., 2017) are the main steps forward 
mentioned in literature (Lange et al, 2016). Poor infrastructure, inefficient customs and other 
issues hamper trade flows within the region, despite the positive impact of proximity of countries. 
The costs of trade clearly seem to be a significant obstacle not only for integration or rather 
participating in global trade but also for integration within the ECOWAS region (Lange et al., 
2016). Trade facilitation measures could particularly target the aspects which cause the higher 
trade costs in the ECOWAS region, which includes the G5 Sahel). “The lack of implementation 
impinges on the creation of an economic union and has, amongst other factors, encouraged 
informal trade and smuggling, both of which benefit from different prices and business costs 
across borders” (Lange et al., 2016). Making regional agreements transparent for businesses, 
not only the modern sectors, but also the SMEs, and focussing more on the principle of mutual 
recognition instead of the current principle of harmonisation in order to align regulations in the 
West-African region are mentioned in the literature.  
Value chain and industrial cluster development  
In the literature there is a consensus to that production, manufacturing and service industries 
should cluster together, as clusters they generate more productivity gains and job creation, by 
attracting new industry into a sparse industrial landscape, like the Sahel countries. For foreign 
investors, no single firm has the incentive to locate in a new area in the absence of others. 
Governments can foster industrial clusters by concentrating quality institutions, social services, 
and infrastructure in special areas. Mali, Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast all launched a common 
special economic zone to boost foreign investment.27 Linking such zones to local supply chains is 
important to create added value and jobs. The agri-food industry and cotton industry in the Sahel 
both have the potential to do this (Allen et al., 2018).  
Value chain development, open markets and trade could increase productivity that could create 
more and productive jobs in the sector. Such industrial clusters and value chains (e.g. livestock, 
cotton, fish, rice, maize, vegetables) rely on effective linkages with a modern service sector (for 
legal protection, quality control, knowledge and capital). In the case of cotton, Burkina Faso, Mali 
and Chad only have very basic cotton processing, like ginning the cotton and exporting cotton 
fiber and cotton lint (USDA GAIN, 2018). Any investment in manufacturing and processing goes 
to these activities that therefore rely on less added value jobs than textile manufacturing and 
spinning. Creating an industrial cluster that add more value, needs to be competitive in the 
international market and relies on public and private investment in infrastructure and capacity 
building. The theory is that manufacturing is historically the ideal way to increase productivity 
levels and achieve growth (Bhorat et al., 2016). For example, productivity increases, together 
with the mass absorption of many unskilled workers, help the transition from farming to other 
more diverse and productive job opportunities, while still linking with commercialised small and 
medium size producers for inclusive value chains. Furthermore, as manufacturing products are 
tradable at global level, the sector can grow without domestic demand. 
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However, Rodrik (2015) shows that by looking at the bigger picture the benefits for African 
countries to turn to industrialisation, and manufacturing in particular, are diminishing.28 This 
applies to both the employment and output shares of manufacturing in GDP, showing that in 
general developing countries are now benefiting less from output and labour absorption in the 
manufacturing sector then some decades ago. Furthermore, manufacturing work needs more 
skills due to new technologies and demand structures in international supply chains, which 
makes it more difficult for countries in the Sahel to reduce the skills gap. As a consequence, the 
majority of the labour force – even if they have worked in the formal sector before – could in the 
future find jobs in the informal sector, with low productivity levels and which are non-tradable. If 
labour moves from high productivity to low productivity, as Rodrik (2015) predicts, this will result 
in higher inequality and will leave islands of modern activity in developing countries, with a far 
less optimistic outlook for the economy as a whole. One solution that governments are looking 
for is focusing on opportunities for service sector development that could link with industrial 
clusters. High productivity and tradable services, like finance and insurance, only attract high-
skilled workers and could not be the labour absorbing machine that manufacturing was. 
Furthermore, the bulk of the service sector is low productivity and non-tradable work, like 
cleaning and security services. It generates jobs, but they are not economic growth poles and 
therefore, is falling short as an alternative motor for economic transformation (Rodrik, 2015). 
This complexity around the creation of industrial clusters within value chains, which should 
absorb workers from the agricultural sector and informal sector in cities, shows the importance of 
innovative inclusive business models and enabling capabilities as the building blocks for future 
economic growth (Bhorat et al., 2016). Until now, inclusive business models tend to be far from 
collaborating with informal economic systems and actors in search for mutual benefit, corporate 
businesses that target the poor tend to treat informal economies as a pool of workers and 
organisational resources to be tapped for the benefit of corporate actors (Meagher, 2018). 
Fressoli et al. (2014, p. 278) point out, “inclusion is not an unproblematic, smooth endeavour; 
rather, in practice it can also involve uneven, unequal, incomplete and sometimes antagonistic 
processes and outcomes”. Strategies of formal business actors are mainly ignoring the wider 
informal ecosystem, making it less clear that they improve economic opportunities for informal 
workers, entrepreneurs and consumers (Meagher, 2018).  
Green economy  
One of the opportunities that could become the driver for non-traditional job creation in the Sahel 
countries is the green economy. Mainly in renewable energy sources, in particular solar energy. 
Burkina Faso opened the biggest solar installation in West Africa in 2017 (funded via EUR 25 
million in donations from the EU and a loan of EUR 22.5 million from the French development 
agency).29 The 55-hectare plant on the outskirts of the capital Ouagadougou has a capacity of 33 
megawatts, annually 56 gigawatts - equivalent to 5% of current total energy production. The 
electricity goes into the network of national power firm Sonabel. There are plans to increase the 
capacity to 50MW and two other solar energy plants are being built in other parts of the country. 
However, just 20% of the overall population is hooked up to the grid.30 Many people use wood or 
butane gas bottles. The solar energy cost 45 CFA francs (EUR 0.07) per kilowatt-hour, a third of 
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the 145 CFA francs per kilowatt-hour it costs to produce electricity at fossil-fuel plants, according 
to Sonabel. Burkina Faso hopes to meet 30% of its electricity needs from photovoltaic solar 
panels by 2030, and hopes to become self-sufficient in electricity production (it imports electricity 
from Ghana and Ivory Coast). In June 2015, Mali signed an agreement with Eranove, and African 
company, to finance and develop a hydroelectric dam along with the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC, private arm of the World Bank). However, the latter withdrew its participation, 
bringing the project to a halt for the moment.31 
The direct employment generation is small, as the technology is imported and, in case of Burkina 
Faso, built by French companies. However, big solar installations are not the only way to deliver 
renewable energy to the population. A new industry of mini-solar systems for poor households 
can create more direct jobs, plus, more importantly, generates spill-overs to give communities 
more productive opportunities where they are not connected to the grid. Evidence from literature 
shows that grid-based electrification is only an attractive option in densely populated areas, with 
an expected high demand for electricity, and/or within reasonable distance of existing high 
voltage power lines.32 Opening the market for solar panels is a way of creating new job 
opportunities and improve livelihoods, in particular in remote areas; e.g. giving households 
access to ICTs and more productive hours (Harrison et al., 2016; UNEP, 2014). Stand-alone 
pico-solar lights put off-grid populations on the first step of the energy ladder, while making 
significant savings on kerosene, dry-cell batteries and candle costs and improving lumen/hour 
light quality. Solar Home Systems (SHS) are more expensive, but with pay-as-you-go models 
proving successful in parts of Africa for the poorest households the technology is affordable up to 
around US$150 for a three years pay period. Thus, innovative business models can be seen in 
several parts in sub-Saharan Africa, with impact on job opportunities.33 
For the Sahel, no studies could be found for the off-grid solar solutions, however, from other 
literature it shows that up to 15,000 new jobs have been created in the wider economy in sub-
Saharan Africa as a result of the transition to efficient off-grid lighting (UNEP, 2014, p.3). 
Renewable and efficient energy create many times more jobs than non-renewable energy 
systems do, particularly for non-oil producing countries. In Bangladesh alone, the Africa Progress 
Panel (2015) found that 10 years ago there were an estimated 25,000 small solar systems in the 
country. There are now 3.5 million and it is estimated that the boom has created around 114,000 
jobs in solar panel assembly. A related issue is the traditional role of the kerosene vendor. 
Rather than trying to put them out of business, it should be preferred to involve them in the 
business of selling modern lighting systems (IEA, 2013, p.13). The combination of more and 
better light, access to ICTs and awareness of solar technology increases opportunities of 
marketing new services and technologies to off-grid populations. Entrepreneurs enter the market 
with special applications for mobile phones, SMS-services and solar enabled technologies (e.g. 
solar PV irrigation pumps, solar PV cool storage, solar PV food dryers), with the potential to 
increase economic development and output (IRENA, 2016, p. 61).     
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32 See K4D Helpdesk report: Quak, E. (2018) Lighting and Electricity Services for Off-Grid Populations in sub-
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http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/123456789/13649  
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Linking entrepreneurship, innovation and skills to markets 
An USAID (2017) Sahel Youth Analysis with lessons learned from some youth (employment) 
programmes in Burkina Faso and Niger, shows that there is an opportunity to improve skills of 
youth to increase economic competitiveness. Low skill attainment and literacy, currently stifle job 
growth. Nigerien youth prioritise socioeconomic growth and opportunity, but lack network 
support, demand‐driven, quality training and in some cases literacy/math skills. The study 
(USAID, 2017) identified key barriers to livelihoods diversification efforts: insufficient literacy, 
education, training, and access to credit, skills, and networks to productively engage in micro‐ or 
small enterprises outside of traditional farming and livestock activities. There is a need for 
increased training and support for aspiring entrepreneurs, including improving access to credit, 
apprenticeships, and information to expand opportunities. Many youths in the USAID programme 
dropped out of trainings in Burkina to pursue informal work at mining sites or because they did 
not think they would find employment after trainings. There is also a feeling that most 
opportunities are clustered in the regional capital: “meaningful training opportunities in the more 
rural/satellite towns may offer opportunities where employment services support could make a 
clear difference” (USAID, 2017, p.5). More entrepreneurial youth reported not being able to meet 
the collateral requirements to obtain a loan, even from NGOs, which intend to target their 
demographic; youth relied instead on community loan groups or family and friends to lend them 
small amounts of cash when needed, enabling them to keep small business activities going, but 
not to expand (USAID, 2017). 
Firm and entrepreneurial capabilities is the know-how and working practices used in production 
and largely determine quality and productivity. For better and formal job creation, the Sahel 
countries need higher capability firms and enterprises. Value-chain relationships between 
different firms need to be promoted and need specific skills for entrepreneurs and employees. 
Education as an important solution in keeping up with changing economic and technological 
developments, for productivity growth, and in closing the skills gap and allowing more people to 
find suitable jobs (Bhorat et al, 2016).  
Better entrepreneurship skills can increase productivity and upscaling of small enterprises, also 
with a better chance of growing out of informal sector. In literature and in development 
programmes there is a growing attention to entrepreneurship as an opportunity for poverty 
alleviation and in particular job creation for the unemployed youth in sub-Saharan Africa.34 
Entrepreneurship is the engine of economic growth and it has a catalytic agent for expansion and 
promotion of productive activities in every sphere of the economy. Also, playing a crucial role in 
increasing the competition of emerging sectors, new small businesses are critical to economic 
growth and innovative capacity (Omoruyi et al., 2017). Entrepreneurship boosts economic growth 
by introducing innovative technologies, products, and services. Increased competition from 
entrepreneurs’ challenges existing firms to become more competitive (Omoruyi et al., 2017). On 
the overall impact of entrepreneurship programmes, see some recent K4D reports.35 Africa 
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Economic Outlook 2017 shows that about 22% of Africa’s working-age population is starting a 
new business. Meanwhile, about 44% of African entrepreneurs start businesses to utilize the 
chances in the market, although about 33% adopt this as a means of surviving because of the 
level of unemployment in Africa (Omoruyi et al., 2017). 
However, some literature also shows that too much emphasis on entrepreneurship, innovation 
and employability as driver for youth employment is misleading, in particular as vehicle of getting 
entrepreneurs out of the informal sector. Meagher (2018) for example, shows that these policy 
perspectives are out of line as much of Africa has been saturated by decades of economic 
hardship and declining access to land, especially among youth. Meagher identifies four 
mechanisms of adverse incorporation operating within the idea of frugal innovation and inclusive 
business models to get enterprises out of informal or semi-informal constructions:  
 Copying: The strategy of copying from the informal economy is widely encouraged by 
BoP initiatives, with particular reference to micro-packaging, ‘leveraging’ local knowledge 
and identifying market opportunities. These practices are more delicately referred to as 
‘adapting products and processes’ by the UNDP (2008, p. 18) report ‘Creating Value for 
All’.  
 Free-riding: Also referred to as ‘leveraging soft networks’, or ‘leveraging the strengths of 
the poor’, the idea is to reduce costs by free-riding on informal community or economic 
networks and institutions downward flow of benefits that is often checked by the use of 
formal contracts, bureaucratic complexities and other forms of corporate discipline to 
‘align incentives’ and protect corporate profits For example, a high turnover of sales 
agents in BoP distributive networks indicates that benefits are often slow to trickle down.  
 Bypassing nodes of accumulation: This means the sidelining of informal 
manufacturers and de-legitimation of informal commercial intermediaries, including 
informal wholesalers, brokers and money-lenders, who may absorb a higher share of 
profits into the informal economy. BoP strategies call for the replacement of informal 
intermediaries by NGOs or social enterprises to facilitate access to these otherwise 
difficult to reach markets. This serves to restructure value chains away from informal 
nodes of accumulation which redistribute profits into informal economic systems. NGOs 
are regarded as ‘honest brokers’ who facilitate economic inclusion of the poorest, while 
the informal commercial intermediaries are censured for ‘monopolistic behaviour’ (Dolan 
& Rajak, 2016).  
 Shifting risk and costs: In addition to free-riding on informal marketing networks, BoP 
distribution channels that use micro-credit-based payment solutions and micro-
franchising arrangements force informal entrepreneurs to absorb marketing costs, 
turnover risks and interest payments within their very low margins. A number of studies 
have detailed how BoP programmes such as Care International’s Rural Sales 
Programme, Grameen ‘Phone Ladies’, and Avon in South Africa and Brazil transfers risk 
onto poor women by requiring them to buy equipment or goods up front on credit, leaving 
them to cope with increasingly saturated markets, falling returns and in some cases the 
social opprobrium of transgressing cultural boundaries (Dolan & Roll, 2013). Delayed 
payment and financial pressures within low-income communities place increasing strains 
on social networks, eroding rather than strengthening local social capital.  
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Investments 
Public investment is critical to support the delivery of key public services and catalyse economic 
growth and poverty reduction (IMF, 2018, 2017, 2016). For instance, public investment in social 
infrastructure is essential to improve the access to education, to invest in skills gap, while 
investments in economic infrastructure (e.g., roads and electricity) should help expand integrate 
and expand economic sectors and favour the generation of private sector employment. However, 
beyond its level, the efficiency of public investment is crucial. From a theoretical perspective, the 
arguments in favour of scaling up public investment in countries like Chad, Niger, Mali, Burkina 
Faso and Mauritania include the existence of relatively elevated rates of return due to lack of 
productive capital, a higher potential growth due to the removal of bottlenecks to development, 
and the complementarities between public and private capital (IMF, 2016). Improvements in 
public investment management (PIM) are key to enhance the efficiency and productivity of public 
investment.  
Mali - In recent years, the Government of Mali has put in place FDI promotion policies aimed at 
encouraging competitiveness and private sector participation in almost all sectors. FDI flows are 
weak and unstable, due to insecurity and lack of stability. They decreased by 25% in 2017 to 
reach US$266 million (UNCTAD, 2018). The stock of FDI is growing year by year and is close to 
US$4 billion in 2017 (27.8% of the country's GDP). State authority in parts of the North is still 
tenuous, and corruption remains a problem throughout the government, public procurement, and 
both public and private contracting, where demands for bribes are frequently reported. Labour 
regulations, although not fully enforced, are relatively rigid. Therefore, Mali ranked 143rd out of 
190 countries in the Doing Business report 2018 published by the World Bank, falling two 
positions compared to the previous year.36 
 
Mali is looking for investors in the energy sector, to increase electricity and in June 2017, BWSC 
has been awarded a US$100 million contract to build a high-efficiency power plant which will 
increase the power capacity in the country by 25%. Mali is also seeking to privatise its banking 
sector. Many Malian companies have established joint ventures with foreign enterprises in the 
mining sector. The main sectors that attract foreign investors are the exploitation of gold and oil 
and the textile industry. Mali’s leading investors are France, China, Thailand and South Africa. 
Morocco has also been a significant investor (banking and telecommunications) since 2010.37 
Foreign investments play an important part in the Sahel economy and finances. In particular in 
extractive industries and for infrastructure construction, the countries depend on foreign 
investments. The IMF (2018) shows for Mali that gold exports are dominated by multinationals, 
accounted for over 80% of total exports. Although foreign investors are diversifying their 
investments in other economic sectors, such as oil, construction, telecommunication and 
financial services, gold’s share in total exports of goods has consistently exceeded 50% since 
the early 2000s, and was 62% and 67% in 2015 and 2016, respectively (IMF, 2018). However, 
the percentage in tax revenue for mining sector in Mali is smaller with 12% and in GDP 6% (IMF, 
2016). Multinationals (mainly mining and telecommunication operators) generate over 50% of the 
total turnover of corporations subject to corporate income tax, and slightly over 80% of taxable 
profits (IMF, 2018). There is indication that profit shifting by foreign investors in Mali erodes its 
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revenue base, due to the importance of low-tax jurisdictions as origin of FDI into Mali, insufficient 
guidance on transfer pricing and absence of effective thin capitalization rules, and the 
fragmentation of Mali’s tax policy framework in various legislations - which increases the risk of 
incoherent policy making and tax enforcement. On the positive side, Mali’s limited network of tax 
treaties has withholding tax rates close to domestic rates on dividends, interest, and royalties 
(IMF, 2018). 
In 2017, the IMF and the government of Mali undertook an assessment of trends in infrastructure 
quality. This assessment evaluated institutional quality of infrastructure management using PIMA 
framework. The PIMA pictured robust Mali, institutional arrangements for public investment 
management compared with peer countries. This Mali PIM system has, however, not been able 
to deliver durable and quality infrastructure. The existing infrastructure is declining. The stock of 
fixed capital represented approximately 110% of GDP in 2000 and less than 70% of GDP in 2015 
as infrastructure building did not keep up with economic growth (IMF, 2018). The fixed capital 
stock per capita declined by approximately 17 percent between 2000 and 2015 (in constant U.S. 
dollars, subject to purchasing power adjustment, per capita). As a result, the stock of fixed capital 
per capita is now much lower than in other WAEMU countries (IMF, 2018). This substantial 
erosion in public assets can be explained by difficult geopolitical, climate, and environmental 
conditions and insufficient efforts to maintain and renew the country's existing infrastructures. 
As a result, in 2015 Mali was left with one of the poorest capital stock per capita ratio in the 
western Africa sub region. While the overall level of public expenditure to GDP remains below 
the Sub-Saharan Africa average, current spending has risen rapidly over the past five years 
(IMF, 2018). The overall level of public expenditure places Mali in the slightly-lower spender 
category. However, over the past decade, expenditure have grown faster than in the Sub-
Saharan Africa average especially regarding current expenditures. Meeting the developmental 
needs of a growing population requires boosting the efficiency of public spending. Looking at 
health, education and infrastructure spending and their outcomes shows that Mali has space to 
improve the quality and effectiveness of its expenditures (IMF, 2018).  
Burkina Faso – Burkina Faso encourages FDI and offers tax and legal benefits, such as the 
possibility for a foreign company to own 100% of shares in a local company. However, 
investments in sectors as mining, telecommunications, financial services and electricity are 
subject to regulations.38 Significant reforms are being undertaken to facilitate investors into the 
country. Burkina Faso is eligible for the Millennium Challenge Account subsidy (funded by the 
U.S. Government), which could increase investments in the country's human capital. However, 
FDI influx is still weak, but increasing (US$390 million in 2016 and US$486 million in 2017) 
according to the UNCTAD World Investment Report 2018. 
Burkina Faso has been revising its mining code since 2015 and is now planning to introduce an 
oil code as the government is interested in exploring three areas that could be potentially suitable 
for oil extraction. The country is looking for a new partner that would take over extraction 
activities in the Tambao deposit (worth US$1 billion, currently the largest in the world), which 
should bring in significant foreign investment.39 Since 2013, Burkina Faso has published its data 
on the revenues from the mining sector, thus increasing transparency in an effort to improve the 
business climate. The latter nonetheless remains poor, the country ranking 148th in the 2018 
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Doing Business Report published by the World Bank, two spots lower compared to 2017.40 While 
improving access to credit information, the country needs to work on access to electricity, 
protecting minority investors, resolving insolvency issues and strengthening contracts. The main 
investing countries are Lebanon and France (70% of FDI).41 
Addressing the country’s infrastructure gap is critical to maintaining the growth momentum. In 
this context, the country’s accelerated growth strategy envisaged doubling the public investment 
budget to US$2.2 billion over a five-year period (Kabedi-Mbuyi et al., 2016). At the same time, 
reconciling the necessary financing for the urgent infrastructure needs with debt sustainability is 
challenging, especially in light of the country’s high vulnerability to terms-of-trade shocks. The 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper for 2011–15, titled SCADD (Stratégie de Croissance 
Accélérée et de Développement Durable), sought to achieve strong and sustained economic 
growth while strengthening progress toward poverty reduction. Macroeconomic policies and 
reforms under the SCADD supported economic diversification, enhanced absorptive capacity for 
public investment, increased investment in infrastructure, and an improved business 
environment. In particular, the SCADD emphasised increasing public investment to support 
private sector–led growth and closing the country’s infrastructure gap. The implementation of the 
strategy was estimated to cost about US$15 billion for 2011–15, including a doubling of the 
public investment budget to reach US$2.2 billion in 2015 (Kabedi-Mbuyi et al., 2016). 
Chad – In 2017, FDI inflows into Chad are estimated at US$335 million, with a total stock at 
US$5.4 billion (UNCTAD 2018). The investments are primarily directed toward the oil industry. In 
the World Bank's Doing Business 2018 report, Chad is one of the last countries in the ranking, 
180th out of 190 countries.42 The procedures for starting a business and paying taxes are the 
most burdensome. In addition, insecurity, political instability and poor infrastructure, as well as a 
limited domestic market and a shortage of skilled labour remain major obstacles to investment. 
Protection of private property is inadequate, and fraud is common in property transactions. The 
majority of FDI goes toward oil exploration and infrastructure development. The services sector 
has lately attracted foreign investment too, mostly through telecommunications and banking 
sectors. The country's main investors are Nigeria, France, the United Kingdom and South 
Korea.43 
For decades, investment in Chad remained at very low levels. Between 1960 and 2000, public 
investment flows never exceeded 1.5% of GDP, averaging only 1.2% per year. At the same time, 
private investment flows were also weak, at 2.8% of GDP per year on average (IMF, 2016). 
Investment in Chad took off in the early 2000s, in the wake of the development of the oil sector. 
After the start of oil production by mid-2003, private investment flows, largely linked to the oil 
sector, remained at 8% of GDP per year on average, i.e., three times more than the annual 
average level before Chad’s oil era. The oil sector generated over US$10 billion in public 
revenues for Chad between 2000 and 2013. Consequently, public investment flows increased 
significantly and reached, on average, 9% of non-oil GDP between 2000 and 2013. Despite 
significantly higher flows since 2001 (and without taking into account the recent recession in oil 
sector in Chad), the investment stock remains low in comparison with other African LIDCs. Chad 
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is part of a handful of countries in Africa that have seen a significant increase in their public 
investment stocks between 2005 and 2013 (however as shown above, with a sharp decline in 
2016-2017 due to lower oil prices). As a result, the country closed some of the gap in terms of 
investment levels, with a stock reaching 100% of GDP (of which 30% of GDP in public 
investment) in 2013 (IMF, 2016). Despite this substantial increase in less than one decade, Chad 
remains the African country with the lowest capital stock measured in percent of GDP. That said, 
this increase would appear more significant if the ratio was calculated as a percentage of non-oil 
GDP (IMF, 2016).  
The infrastructure gap has decreased in recent years, but Chad still suffers many deficiencies in 
this area. On the eve of the oil era, Chad's infrastructure was exceptionally poor, even by the 
standards of other African LIDCs. Less than 10% of 6,200 kilometres of roads were paved in 
2000, and access to power, electricity, telecommunications, water, and health services were 
highly underdeveloped (IMF, 2016). Significant progress has been made since then, as reflected 
by several existing indicators (IMF, 2016):  
 The World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) shows that the 
perception of the quality of overall infrastructure in Chad increased, on a scale of 1 to 7 
(best) from 1.55 in 2007 to 2.43 in 2016. However, progress has been widespread 
amongst LIDCs, and the perception of the quality of infrastructure in Chad remains 
significantly lower than in Sub-Saharan African countries on average. Finally, on the 
access to telecommunications, while progress has been significant (for instance, mobile 
phones subscriptions per 100 habitants reached almost 40 in 2016, compared to only 1.4 
in 2007), this level remains more than two times lower than the average for Sub-Saharan 
African countries.  
 In the same vein, the infrastructure pillar of the Logistics Performance Index developed 
by the World Bank shows Chad’s overall ranking moving up from 141st in 2007 to 112th 
in 2014. This index is more favourable to Chad than the GCI, since it shows that Chad is 
now slightly above the average of Sub-Saharan African countries in terms of 
infrastructure, which can be explained by the focus on trade logistics’ infrastructure (like 
roads). 
While the PIMA methodology has not yet been fully applied to Chad, general results for LIDCs 
suggest weaknesses in terms of public investment efficiency in Chad. For instance, the 2011 
Public Investment Management Index (PIMI) showed that Chad is among the worst performers 
among 71 countries (40 low-income and 31 middle-income countries), in particular regarding the 
strategic guidance and project appraisal, the project selection and budgeting, and the evaluation 
and audit of projects (IMF, 2016). 
Niger - FDI flows to Niger accounted for US$3.5 billion in 2017, a decrease from US$4.45 billion 
in 2016. Since uranium mining represent a large part of FDI, the drop in uranium prices affected 
inflows.44 FDI stock grew to US$6.37 billion in 2017 (UNCTAD 2018).The mining and oil sectors 
attract the most FDI. France, China, Japan, Sweden and the United States are the country's 
leading investors.45 Niger ranked 144th out of 190 countries in the World Bank Doing Business 
ranking 2018.46 This highlights the significant progress made in the areas of business creation, 
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cross-border trade and the protection of minority investors, among others. Niger's business 
climate has nonetheless improved thanks to the adoption of a new investment code, a reduction 
in the minimum capital required to start a new business, faster access to water and an improved 
system for information about access to credit. Additionally, Niger offers incentives to investors 
regarding infrastructure development. 
In 2017 the World Bank approved a US$50 million IDA grant for Niger to support reforms in 
public investment and public finance management, and the operationalisation of the regulatory 
frameworks necessary for well-functioning public irrigation and electricity sectors.47 According to 
the IMF, Niger’s public finance management systems have improved over the past years but 
remain weak, which undermines public service delivery. More effective public investment 
management will help use efficiently public resources, particularly in a context of fiscal 
consolidation. The grant will finance the second Public Investment Reform Support Credit 
(PIRSC 2). The PIRSC series is designed to support and address challenges in the 
implementation of the Nigerien Government’s national poverty reduction strategy, the Economic 
and Social Development Plan (Plan de Développement Economique et Social – PDES). As part 
of the PDES objectives, the development of irrigation through the 3N (Nigeriens Nourish 
Nigeriens) strategy aims to reduce the risks of volatility related to rain-fed agriculture. Similarly, 
the development of the electricity sector has significant poverty reduction and growth dividends in 
a country where less than 10% of the population has access to electricity. Increasing the 
efficiency of public spending and ensuring high return of public investment is therefore key, and 
requires undertaking a vast public finance management and public investment management 
reform agenda.48 
Mauritania - Mauritania promotes its strategic geographical location to attract new investors. In 
February 2016, the World Bank granted US$10million in aid to the country to support the 
development of the Nouadhibou duty-free zone, which aims to attract foreign investors.49 FDI 
inflows reached US$330 million in 2017 according to the World Investment Report published by 
UNCTAD, with a 21% increase compared to 2016. Estimated at US$7 billion, the total stock of 
FDI represents 139.8% of the country's GDP. The majority of the investments has targeted the 
sectors of oil exploration and exploitation, mineral mining of iron ore and gold, 
telecommunications with the acquisition of mobile phone licenses and the construction 
sector. China has been showing a steadily increasing interest in Mauritania, and its traditional 
trading partners, including its European partners (primarily Hungary and France), seem likely to 
pursue their investment projects in the country (infrastructure and telecommunications).50 
Mauritania is making steady progresses in matter of business climate. It gained eight places in 
last year ranking of the World Bank and won 10 more places in 2018, reaching the 150th place 
out of 190 economies (2018 Doing Business).51 
The World Bank published recently a study (2018 – French) that analyses the country’s 
economic outlook through the lens of public investment and expenditure on social protection. It 
concludes that although massive investments in infrastructure projects - such as the construction 
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of thousands of kilometres of paved roads, the electrification of the country, and the provision of 
potable water - have helped expand the population’s access to basic services (while increasing 
the government deficit), protecting the most vulnerable populations from the impact of budget 
restrictions aimed at containing public debt remains a priority (World Bank, 2018). Yet, the share 
of public investment allocated to human development grew from 4.7% of total public investment 
in 2010 to over 10% in 2015, then fell again to 2.7% in 2016. Although the Mauritanian 
authorities maintained a prudent fiscal stance in 2017 by broadening the tax base and 
implementing expenditure controls, the report nonetheless emphasises the need to establish a 
more effective public investment management system, prioritising projects that combine 
economic performance and social impact (World Bank, 2018).  
8. Opportunities and challenges 
Opportunities 
Urbanisation - Urbanisation and rising incomes are driving major transformations, in particular in 
the food economy. Households increasingly rely on markets and look for foods that are more 
diverse and convenient to buy, prepare and consume. This transformation in local diets cuts 
across all countries and income groups and involves a move towards increased consumption of 
higher-value perishable and processed products (Staatz & Hollinger, 2016; Allen and Heinrigs, 
2016). The changes in what people consume and how they access food are also driving demand 
for new and greater activities along food value chains, the majority of which are in the off-farm 
segments of the food economy. The Sahel countries are among the least urbanised countries in 
the world, however, urbanisation is taking place gradually, shaping a gradual transformation of 
the food economy, with the opportunity to create jobs in urban and peri-urban areas related to 
food systems.  
Remittances - Remittances to Sahel countries have increased significantly and are expected to 
rise further. In literature remittances are linked to economic activities in the countries, giving 
opportunities for productive investment for small businesses (Fransen et al., 2016). The data for 
the Sahel shows the regional link, with most remittances going to neighbouring countries, which 
is good for building social networks that could drive further regional openness and trade. 
However, data also shows the differences between countries. Burkina Faso received US$406 
million in 2016 (3.6% of GDP) – mainly from Ghana, but also from European countries as Italy 
and France. Remittances were also send to family in the region, mainly to Ivory Coast, Ghana, 
Mali and Nigeria.52 In Mali US$937 million remittances were received in 2016 (6.7% of GDP) – 
mainly from France, but also from Nigeria and Gabon. The amount that was send abroad is 
much lower and went mainly to Burkina Faso, France, Senegal and Nigeria.53 In Niger 
remittances were US$182 million (2.4% of GDP) – mainly from Nigeria and Benin. Niger is one of 
the countries that send out more remittances US$395 million in 2016, mainly to Nigeria.54 For 
Chad and Mauritania no data exist for the received remittances. For Chad the remittances send 
out of the country have dropped significantly with the recession in the country (in 2012 US$1.4 
billion – nearly 12% of GDP - to US$217 million in 2016). Money goes to Nigeria, suggesting the 
oil employment link between the two countries. In Mauritania remittances send out of the country 
have increased significantly over the years to US$223 million in 2016 (4.7% of GDP) - mainly to 
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Senegal and Mali. This suggests indeed the increasing amount of migrant workers in the country 
as was expressed earlier in the report.55 
Advancements in food system thinking - Successful development of the untapped 
employment and production potential in the food economy requires an essential understanding of 
the food system, including local and spatial contexts. Well-rounded jobs strategies, in particular 
for youth and women, need to integrate a systems approach that captures the links between 
agricultural productivity, off-farm employment and rural and urban areas. In the Sahel, promoting 
non-agricultural employment will depend on supporting private enterprises, in particular SMEs, to 
drive growth and job creation (Allen et al., 2018). Policies aimed at supporting value chain 
development, integrated skills development and systems as well as improving the overall 
business climate are important elements in the jobs agenda. In addition, off-farm activities and 
the food economy in general, play a particularly important role in women’s employment. 68% of 
all employed women in West Africa work in the food economy (Allen et al., 2018). Women 
dominate employment in off-farm segments including food-away-from-home, food processing 
and food marketing. Yet women rarely have access to the resources needed to develop their 
activities in relation to their potential and ambitions, in particular in the Sahel G5 (Allen et al., 
2018). Policies and investments promoting off-farm food economy activities will have a 
particularly large impact on women. The employment opportunities in food value chains, 
including in farming, require skill sets that are rapidly evolving. Anticipating and supporting these 
educational requirements are of major importance to the jobs agenda. Equipping youth, and in 
particular young women, with the necessary skills and education and reducing barriers to 
productive resources, will significantly promote employment potential and diversification. For 
example, diagnostic for Mali by the World Bank (2015) suggests the following priorities: 
liberalisation of the cotton sector, increasing support for agricultural R&D, increasing land 
cultivation of semi-arid agriculture in southern Mali, increasing production of export competitive 
fruits (mango, papaya) and vegetables (shallot/onion, potato), improving management practices 
of land and water, addressing governance issues at the Office du Niger, reforming fertilizer 
subsidies, and improving infrastructure for pastoralists. 
The Sahel is a case of living perpetually with risk, thus more emphasis on long-term structural 
solutions is required to improve the resilience of the agricultural sector. Designing and 
implementing a comprehensive agricultural risk management strategy will require sustained and 
substantial financial investments, shifting the focus from short-term crisis response to long-term 
risk management, streamlining disparate donor investments and isolated interventions toward 
the core problem, supporting decentralised community and farm level decision making, 
integrating agricultural risk management into the existing development frameworks, prioritising 
agricultural risks into government and donor strategies, and focusing on implementation (World 
Bank).56 A landscape approach describes interventions at spatial scales that attempt to optimise 
the spatial relations and interactions among a range of land cover types, institutions, and human 
activities in an area of interest.57 
Spending productively public revenues from extractive sector – Another opportunity is to 
use the revenues from the extractive industry for investments in job creation. Although the sector 
                                                   
55 Idem: Country Economy 
56 See report World Bank: Transforming Agriculture in the Sahel. 
http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/Africa/transforming-agriculture-in-the-sahel-
background-note-english.pdf  
57 Idem World Bank. 
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does not generate many direct jobs to absorb the low-skilled workers into productive jobs in the 
formal mining, oil and gas sectors, with good public investment management policies and 
taxation policies that are related to attract foreign investors (mainly in extractive industries, but 
also in other sectors as finance, telecommunication, construction and tourism), public revenues 
can increase significantly and be used for productive investments and job creation (Daniel et al., 
2016; Chuhan-Pole, 2017).58  
Main challenges 
Demography - A young population in the Sahel presents the opportunity for the countries to 
benefit from a potentially large ‘growth’ dividend (IMF, 2015). According to UN population 
projections, the Sahel countries could undergo a demographic transition over the next few 
decades, characterised by declines in infant mortality and fertility rates, with a resulting increase 
in the share of the working-age population relative to the overall population. This demographic 
transition would be characterised by a higher share of the population that is potentially 
economically productive and can create income, boost fiscal revenues and ease the burden of 
fiscal expenditure on services such as healthcare and education. The potential impact on growth 
from these effects could be important. A paper of Drummond et al (2014) estimated that a 1% 
increase in the working age population increases real GDP growth per capita by 0.5%. However, 
the demographic growth dividend remains negligible if fertility rates decline only modestly or if the 
labour market is unable to absorb the new workers in productive activities, like in the Sahel (IMF, 
2016). The increase in the share of working-age population may not yield growth benefits as 
evidence from Fox et al. (2013) suggests that there are speed limits with which the 
manufacturing and service sectors can absorb new workers, with any excess labour force to 
seek informal employment in urban areas or in subsistence agriculture.  
Security: A large amount of recent literature on the Sahel countries is about the insecurity in the 
countries. With insecurity increasing in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad. The region is prone 
to human insecurity, instability and faces a high level of refugees. For example, in Chad the 
recent budgetary problems have been compounded by the tense security situation, particularly in 
the Lake Chad basin. Chadian security forces had to be deployed across the country to 
undertake regional peace-keeping efforts, the costs of which put pressure on the national budget. 
The severe drought, and the resulting food insecurity also added to the country’s problems. The 
humanitarian crisis in the region has also had a spillover effect on Chad, which hosts a large 
number of refugees and displaced persons (IMF, 2018). The security relates to youth 
unemployment, food insecurity, high levels of smuggling (goods, arms, drugs and migrants to 
Europe). More information can be read about the multiple levels of human insecurity in the region 
in Sahel Watch (living analysis) provided by The Broker.59 
Skills gap – Creating jobs in the Sahel needs fast investment in human capital to ensure better 
skills for productive jobs. Employability is key, however, training, education, re-education and 
capacity development for example to increase entrepreneurship skills can only succeed when 
integrated within the broader picture of the labour market. Not only has the incidence of 
informality tended to increase significantly at lower educational levels; but, over the past three 
                                                   





decades, there has been an observed significant increase for those with lower skills to be more 
involved in the informal trade despite relatively high economic growth that African region has 
experienced in the past decade, which, theoretically speaking, should have created more jobs in 
the formal sector and provide opportunities to absorb even the semi-skilled labourers during the 
period (Koroma et al., 2017). This period also corresponds with the global economy experiencing 
increased trade liberalisation; high foreign direct investments inflows especially to developing 
countries; and increased expansion in global value chain development. One of the conclusions is 
that the skill-biased nature of international trade is at the heart of some of the observed linkages 
between trade liberalisation and increased informality among low-skilled populations (Goldberg & 
Pavcnik (2007). Opportunities for wage employment are limited. Few people are employed in the 
formal sector. Therefore, if the skill gap remains, casual labour opportunities on farm or in off-
farm enterprises, by contrast, are much more likely to emerge. 
9. Appendix: Donor interventions related to job creation 
Burkina Faso:   
World Bank Bagre Growth 
Pole Project 
The project contributes to increased economic activity, resulting in an 
increase in private investment, employment generation, and 
agricultural production. In 2018, the project received an additional 
financing that covers costs of electricity, roads, and the diagnostics 
for an industrial park for agricultural transformation in the project 
area, which have not been completed under the existing credit 
because of cost overruns for the construction of irrigation canals. The 
additional finance also allows for scaling up existing activities such as 
establishing effective investment promotion systems, improving the 
investment climate, providing additional support to value chains in the 
project area, and land tenure pilots. The extended closure date is 
November 2020.  
http://projects.worldbank.org/P161234?lang=en 
World Bank Livestock Sector 
Development 
Support Project 
The development objective of Livestock Sector Development Support 
Project for Burkina Faso are to enhance productivity and 
commercialization of non-pastoral animal production in selected 
chains, and strengthen the country’s capacity to respond to severe 
crises affecting the livestock sector, and to provide immediate and 
effective response in the event of an Eligible Crisis or Emergency. 
This project has three components. 1) The first component, Improved 
access to livestock services and inputs, aims to enhance livestock 
productivity in selected value chains through improved access of 
producers to animal health services and inputs, and institutional 
strengthening of MRAH’s operational capacity to efficiently carry out 
its core responsibilities. It comprises three sub-components: (i) 
Improving livestock producers’ access to animal health services; (ii) 
Improving livestock producers’ access to quality inputs to raise better 
livestock and (iii) Institutional strengthening. 2) The second 
component, Livestock Value Chains Development, aims to 
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strengthen the efficiency and competitiveness of selected livestock 
value chains (beef, small ruminants, milk, poultry and pig, as well as 
honey and aquaculture) to enhance production and meet the demand 
of national and regional markets while generating higher incomes for 
value chains actors and creating employment opportunities. The 
project ends in July 2022. 
http://projects.worldbank.org/P159476?lang=en  





The project aims to improve the efficiency and safety of transport 
services on the Burkinabé section of the Ouagadougou (Burkina 
Faso) – Abidjan (Côte d’Ivoire) - road transport corridor. The first 
component, Institutional strengthening and capacity building support 
for public and private sector participants in the transport sector, will 
strengthen the capacity of the Government of Burkina Faso and of 
professional associations/organisations in the transport and trade 
sectors to provide more efficient services to the private sector 
operating on the Burkinabé section of the Corridor. It has the 
following subcomponents: (i) Strengthen the institutional capacity of 
the Ministry of Transport, Urban Mobility and Road Safety 
(MITMUSR) and related agencies; (ii) Support to transport operators 
and stakeholders; and (iii) Support to joint initiatives and coordination 
to facilitate trade on the Corridor. The second component, 
Development of a heavy cargo truck renewal scheme, is designed to 
support the development of a self-sustaining long haul heavy cargo 
truck renewal scheme. It has the following subcomponents: (i) 
Technical assistance required to put in place an operational 
framework for a truck fleet renewal program as well as for the 
recovery and recycling of decommissioned trucks; (ii) Support the 
establishment of a truck renewal scheme to facilitate the replacement 
of old unsafe trucks with new ones; and (iii) Support operation of 
technical committee for the implementation of the financial 
mechanism and for management of old unsafe trucks scrapping 
scheme. The third component, Support to customs modernisation 
and trade facilitation on the Burkinabé section of the Corridor, aims to 
strengthen transport, trade and transit facilitation along the Burkinabé 
section of the Corridor. This project ends in June 2021. 
http://projects.worldbank.org/P156892?lang=en  





The project’s objective is to increase access to temporary 
employment and skills development opportunities for out-of- school 
youth. The project has three components. The first component is 
labour intensive public works. The short-term objective of this 
component will be to provide immediate employment for youth with 
no or little education through Labour Intensive Public Works (LIPW). 
It will promote the participation of women by selecting activities that 
are supportive of women employment and reserving a percentage of 
the LIPW jobs specifically for women. This component will also (with 
third component) support the mainstreaming of LIPWs into national 
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policies, strategies and procedures and the establishment of a 
permanent capacity for LIPWs in the country. The second 
component is skills development. This component aims to improve 
youth employability by offering youth with different skills levels within 
their first training experience. This component has following three 
sub-components: (1) development of initial vocational training 
through a dual training approach for economic sectors (sub-
component 2-1 A) and establishment of a demand driven training 
system and provision of training (sub-component 2-1 B); (2) 
apprenticeship program; and (3) entrepreneurship training and 
provision of follow up support to entrepreneurs. The third component 
is institutional capacity strengthening and project management. The 
purpose of this component is to: (a) strengthen the capacity of 
private and public sector institutions to engage in an informed policy 
dialogue on skills and employment on a regular basis, e.g. through 
technical capacity strengthening and the creation of a mechanism for 
consultations and collaboration; and (b) improve the knowledge base 






The Country Programming Framework (CPF) 2017-2020 shapes 
FAO assistance in Burkina Faso. The CPF is centred on the following 
three priority areas:  Strengthening food security and nutrition and 
people’s resilience to climate change  Increasing rural communities’ 
incomes through sustainable and efficient agricultural production 
systems  Improving governance of the rural sector Jointly prepared 
with the Government and other development partners, the CPF 
reflects relevant priorities in key national development policies, 
including the National Economic and Social Development Plan 
(PNDES) and the National Programme for the Rural Sector (PNSR). 
Fully aligned with the UN Development Assistance Framework for 












The project aims at supporting Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises 
(MSMEs), including in the informal economy, to prevent occupational 
risks, improve working conditions, and promote respect for 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (FPRW). The project 
runs between January 2016  and December 2019. MSMEs lack 
visibility, labour inspection visits and appropriate follow up is very 
limited. Thus, the project aims at supporting MSMEs, including in the 
informal economy, to prevent occupational risks , improve working 
conditions, and promote respect for Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work (FPRW). In order to achieve its goal, the project 
implements a twofold strategy: i) it supports national labour 
inspectorates to better ensure compliance; ii) it increases the 
capacities of Governments, of employers, workers and their 
representatives, as well as those of Governments and other public 
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Institutions (such as National school of Administration and Judicial 
Institutes) to promote and implement FPRW and Occupational Safety 
and Health (OSH) issues regulations on the ground. Burkina Faso is 









This project, funded by OPEC Fund for International Development, 
runs until 2023. It works on structural transformation of the national 
economy through sustainable and inclusive growth underpinned 
largely by a modernised agriculture sector. By developing four 
agricultural value chains – rice, vegetables, sesame and cowpea – 
the project contributes to achieving this objective. In particular, the 
project will improve smallholder farmers’ productivity, add value to 
agricultural products and promote entrepreneurship to overcome slow 
growth in rural areas. The project will focus on the regions of Boucle 
du Mouhoun, Cascades and Hauts-Bassins where it will build on and 
scale up the gains made by previous programmes. The project will 
target 57,000 households, of which 27,500 households will receive 
production support, 27,000 will be assisted in setting up or 
consolidating rural microenterprises and 2,500 will be supported in 
value chain development. Of the target groups, the project will 
endeavour to reach a minimum of 50 per cent of women and 30 per 






Job creation in 
fashion and 
design sectors 
(Mali and Burkina 
Faso) 
The European Union and the International Trade Center (ITC) have 
launched a €10 million project to support job creation in the fashion 
and design sectors in Burkina Faso and Mali. Funded by the EU 
Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, the project targets young people 
and women, and on vocational training and the creation of small and 
microenterprises. The project, implemented by ITC through its Ethical 
Fashion Initiative, will support the development of the textile and 
crafts sectors, including taking advantage of the unique Bogolan, 
Basilan and Indigo dyeing and printing techniques. By developing 
local capacities, the initiative will promote the sustainable export of 
this cultural wealth to international markets. The project aims to 
create up to 5,000 direct and 6,000 indirect jobs in the coming four 
years in Burkina Faso and Mali. notably through vocational training, 
support for social enterprises that respect fair labour standards and 
ensuring added value in handicraft sector. Increased value-added 
cotton processing will generate employment opportunities for women 
and young people from marginalized communities while offering an 













The development objectives of First Economic Recovery and 
Resilience Development Policy Operation Project for Chad and 
pillars are to (1) enhance fiscal risk management; (2) improve oil 
revenue transparency and management; (3) promote resilience and 
economic diversification in key real sectors; and (4) increase social 
protection for the poor and vulnerable. The series has been designed 
to leverage and complement ongoing and planned World Bank 
projects and Technical Assistance (TA) activities across the four 
pillars, in the areas of resources mobilization and State-owned 
Enterprise (SOE) management, agriculture, and social protection 
This programmatic series will also help catalyze private investment 
through improving the investment climate and creating opportunities 
in key sectors of the economy. With the support of this operation, the 
government intends to promote the transparency and effectiveness 
of its fiscal policy through the establishment of a functional oil 
revenue management mechanism. The project ends in June 2020.  
http://projects.worldbank.org/P163424?lang=en  
World Bank Value Chain 
Support Project 
The development objective is to improve: (i) targeted aspects of the 
business environment; and (ii) the performance of agro-pastoral 
value chains in the Republic of Chad. The project is composed of 
three components. The first component, improving the business 
environment aims to the Chad government's efforts to improve the 
business environment. It comprises of following two sub-
components: (i) support with formulating and implementing business 
environment reforms; and (ii) improve trade logistics procedures. The 
second component, support to the meat and dairy value chains aims 
to strengthen the meat and dairy value chains by carrying out a 
program of activities aimed at improving meat and milk facilities, 
assisting the recipient in enhancing the meat industry to meet 
regionally accepted certification standards. It is composed of 
following two sub-components: (i) upgrade existing infrastructure and 
facilities; and (ii) support to business development in the meat and 
dairy value chains. The third component, project management aims 
to build the capacity of national institutions, especially the 
coordination unit that will be responsible for project management and 






FAO’s assistance in Chad is defined by the Country Programming 
Framework (CPF) 2017-2021, which is aligned with the 
Organization’s technical and policy expertise and the Government’s 
priorities, as reflected in the National Development Plan (2017-2021), 
whose objective is to achieve the National Agenda – “2030 vision, 
the Chad we want”. The vision includes an ambitious National 
Investment Plan for the Rural Sector based on the Comprehensive 
Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP). The CPF 
focuses on three priority areas:  The development of sustainable 
agricultural value chains addressing the challenge of sustainable 
food production in the sectors of crops, livestock, and forestry.  The 
formulation and implementation of policies and sectoral strategies for 
food security and nutrition.  The sustainable management and use of 
natural resources to build community, institutional and household 
resilience. 
Swiss Contact Vocational 
Training 
Programme 
The objective of the project is to promote employability, employment 
– and above all – self-employment among the many young boys and 
girls who are excluded from the formal technical education and 
vocational training system, by developing both their technical and 
business management skills, all while assisting them in their 
transition into professional life. With a programme duration planned 
for 12 years, the significant changes expected are as follows. 1. 
Improvement in the quality of life of young beneficiaries – especially 
young women and marginalised minorities (e.g. internally displaced 
persons, refugees, the unemployed, and the handicapped) in the 
PAFPT15 area of coverage. This will be reflected in: (i) decent and 
sustainable employment or self-employment, (ii) better 
competitiveness on the market thanks to the improvement in services 
and/or products supplied, (iii) increased incomes and improved food 
security. 2. Structural impact on the work environment for young 
people living in urban and rural areas – through improved training 
and support services that will help them find better and higher-paying 
jobs closer to home; these programmes and services will be 
managed in partnership with local actors (local authorities, 
regional/local technical services, and private sector representatives). 
3. Impact on policy and subsector strategy for the formal technical 
education and vocational training system. This will include a 
professional training component adapted to regional and local 
contexts. It will feature diversified curricula geared toward local 
socio-economic demand and will promote self-employment. This 














Matching training to employment is central to AFD’s operations, 
which support the financing mechanism for continuous vocational 
training and apprenticeship. 7,000 employees have already been 
trained in craft, construction and livestock raising activities. AFD also 
gives special attention to the socioeconomic integration of young 
Chadians. With the Bab al Amal project, 3,000 young people will be 
helped to find employment between 2018 and 2021. We are also 
supporting the Small Business Centre, a unique system to support 
entrepreneurship in Chad, which works on self-employment: at the 
end of 2017, over a thousand promoters had already been trained 








The operation is designed to support the implementation of the 
Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper for the period 2016-
2018, known as the ‘Cadre Stratégique pour la Relance Economique 
et le Développement Durable du Mali’ (Strategic Cadre for Economic 
Recovery and Durable Development - CREDD). The CREDD, the 
2015 Systematic Country Diagnostic (SCD) and the FY16-19 
Country Partnership Framework (CPF) for Mali are all closely 
aligned. The PRIGSO operations support the policies defined in the 
CREDD by fostering inclusive growth and supporting pro-poor 
(decentralized) transfers and social protection. This is the second 
operation of a series comprising two single tranche operations. The 
first credit (p157900) in the amount of US$50 million was approved in 
May 2017. Previous development policy operation (DPO) series 
supported efforts to address the twin challenges of fiscal 
consolidation while also tackling governance problems by focusing 
on strengthening Public Financial Management (PFM) and 
Governance. Reforms supported in the past included efforts to 
improve budget transparency, strengthen fiduciary and establishment 
of controls, and improve public investment management, as well as 
actions to reduce opportunities for corruption, accelerate public 
procurement and build local government financial management 
capacity. The present series, by contrast, aims to sustain the 
foundations for inclusive economic growth, decentralization and 
protection of the most vulnerable. The dialogue on PFM reforms is 
mainly driven by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).The project 
ends in June 2019. 
http://projects.worldbank.org/P161619?lang=en  
World Bank Skills 
Development and 
The project’s objective is to support education and training for 





Republic of Mali. The project will be divided into three components: 
(1) Education and Training for Employability; (2) Private-Sector led 
Jobs Creation for Youth; and (3) Institutional Strengthening and 
Project Management. Project’s sub-components under Component 1 
are: (2.1) Supporting Entrepreneurship for Youth; and (2.2) 
Supporting Established Small and Medium Enterprises for Job 
Creation. The project runs until June 2020. 
http://projects.worldbank.org/P145861?lang=en  
World Bank Livestock Sector 
Development 
Support Project 
The development objective is to enhance productivity and 
commercialization of non-pastoral animal production in selected 
value chains, and strengthen the country’s capacity to respond to an 
eligible crisis or emergency. This project has three components. 1) 
The first component, Strengthening of Livestock Services, aims to 
enhance livestock productivity in selected non-pastoral value chains. 
It has the following subcomponents: (i) Animal health and food 
safety; (ii) Productivity enhancement; and (iii) Policy design and 
regulatory framework. 2) The second component, Support to Private 
Investment, aims to strengthen the competitiveness of targeted 
livestock Value chains (VCs) cattle and small ruminants (meat and 
dairy), poultry (eggs and chickens), and fish farming (aquaculture) by 
supporting partnerships between VC actors and facilitating their 
access to markets. It has the following subcomponents: (i) Economic 
organization and incentive framework; (ii) Support to investment 
cycle; and (iii) Investment financing. 3) The third component, Crisis 
Prevention and Management, and Project Coordination, aims not 
only to develop mechanisms for preventing and responding to severe 
crises and emergencies in the livestock sector, but also to strengthen 
project coordination capacities within Ministry of Livestock and 
Fisheries (MEP). It has the following subcomponents:(i) Crisis 
prevention and management; and (ii) Institutional support and project 
coordination. The project runs until June 2014. 
http://projects.worldbank.org/P160641?lang=en  




The objective is to promote the introduction of grid-connected 
renewable energy in Mali through an independent power producer. 
Mali is currently recovering from a complex crisis, which affected the 
country on three fronts: conflict and insecurity in the north, 
institutional and political turmoil in the south, and humanitarian and 
food insecurity across the country due to the 2011 drought. In early 
2012, the vast northern regions fell under the control of extremist 
forces, while a coup in Bamako threw the country into political 
instability and turmoil. By 2014, economic growth had reached pre-
crisis levels, indicating that the economy was catching up and 
recovering from the crisis. In 2012, the gross domestic product (GDP) 
growth dropped to -0.8 percent because of the combined effects of a 
deteriorating business climate and a drop in official development 
assistance. With the progressive consolidation of political stability and 
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improved security conditions in 2013, growth resumed at 2.3 percent 
and accelerated to 7 percent in 2014 its highest level since 2003 
(when it was 7.6 percent). Economic recovery continued in 2015 with 
a 6 percent growth rate. Mali’s current macroeconomic outlook is 
positive, provided the security situation does not deteriorate and 
favorable climatic conditions continue to prevail. Growth is projected 
to be around 5 percent annually over the next two years, with a 
projected decline to 4.7 percent in 2019. During this important 
political period, the World Bank Group has a critical role to play to de-
risk private sector investments in the country and, in turn, support 
economic growth, employment generation, and service delivery in the 
short to medium term. The project ends in June 2019. 
http://projects.worldbank.org/P148355?lang=en  




The aim of this project is to increase the processing of agricultural 
products for targeted value chains in the selected geographic area. 
The Project wiill support the Government of Mali agropoles strategy 
through the following components. 1) Expand mango processing 
and investment opportunities will aim at increasing mango 
production, processing and export, through the following two sub 
components: (a) promote mango processing and exports; and (b) 
strengthen institutional capacities at API-Mali; 2) Improve access to 
mango production areas will finance two types of infrastructure that 
are physical inputs to the mango value chain: (a) the rehabilitation 
of 300 km of rural roads and (b) the construction and modernization 
of seven post-harvest facilities including collection and conditioning 
centres. The objective of this component is to improve the 
uninterrupted and timely supply of agricultural products, mostly 
mangos, by facilitating physical access to production sites, 
collection, and conditioning of products in the Sikasso region. 3) 
Foster animal feed production will assist animal feed industries in 
increasing quantity and quality of production by securing stable 
quality inputs (including cereals and oilseeds). Thus, this 
component will ensure that enough animal feed is produced at low 
cost to catalyze the growth of meat under modern conditions. The 





The programme aims to generate job opportunities to strengthen 
resilience of rural young populations. The FAO works with the 
Ministry of Agriculture to implement Youth at Work: Reducing 
Rural Poverty, a programme which aims at generating attractive 
and decent job opportunities for rural youth with a specific 
attention to girls and young women, a key contribution to 
strengthening resilience for food security and nutrition and 






FAO assistance in Mali is shaped by the 2013-2017 FAO Country 
Programming Framework (CPF), which centres on three priority 
areas:  Support to agricultural production, competitiveness and 
food security, with a focus on the intensification and diversification 
of production and increased opportunities for income-generation 
in the private sector. Increased productivity is to be achieved by 
adopting a value chain approach based on improved 
technologies, institutions and policies, from the supply of inputs to 
agribusiness and agro-processing support. Priority will be given to 
security of tenure for smallholders.  Sustainable natural resource 
management and environmental improvement, with a focus on 
mechanisms for climate change mitigation and adaptation as well 
as resilience and restoration of natural resources. Activities will 
include obsolete pesticide management and sustainable 
development and protection of local livestock breeds and 
production systems.  Disaster risk reduction and management, 
and strengthened resilience of vulnerable population groups 
affected by food and nutrition crises and conflict, including 
rebuilding destroyed production capacity and infrastructure, and 
helping crisis-affected populations to resume agricultural 
production and marketing. This priority area includes building up 
both food and feed stocks, particularly cereal banks, and 
strengthening resilience and capacities of producers as well as 
institutions. 
http://www.fao.org/countryprofiles/index/en/?iso3=MLI  







This project covers the entire country, adopting a phased 
approach so that the project strategy can be tested in the 
Koulikoro and Sikasso regions and later expanded. It runs until 
2021 and gives priority to young people – particularly young 
women – who lack technical skills and access to financing for 
income-generating activities. By supporting vocational training 
and microenterprise development, the project aims to facilitate 
rural young people's access to employment opportunities and 
attractive, well-paying jobs in agriculture and related enterprises. 
As a result, they will become actors in modern agricultural value 
chains that are responsive to market demand and resilient to 
climate change. The specific objectives of the project include: 
Improving regional training mechanisms in response to demand 
from young people, based on the labour market and potential job 
prospects; Promoting economic initiatives by rural young people 
in agricultural value chains and related economic activities, to 
enable them to gain sustainable access to vocational 
employment. Producer organizations were closely involved in 
project formulation, will be represented as stakeholders on the 
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project steering committee and will take part in project 
supervision. In addition, they will be tasked with various facilitation 
and training activities. 
https://www.ifad.org/web/operations/project/id/1661/country/mali  
Danida The Program for 
Support to 
Economic Growth 
and Promotion of 
Employment 
stimulated by the 
Private Sector 
(PACEPEP) 
This programme runs until 2018. It aims to increase rural incomes 
and employment as well as enhance the competitiveness of 
economies in the areas targeted by the programme. In order to 
achieve the expected results, the PACEPEP has been divided into 
three (3) components, the component 1 is now supported by the 
National Council of Employers of Mali (CNPM) with the support of the 
Danish Technical Assistance Office NIRAS. PACEPEP's intervention 
strategy is aimed at developing the private sector and improving the 
structuring of targeted sectors. It wants to promote a better public-
private dialogue and between private actors themselves as well as an 
improvement of the business environment. Contribute to the 
development of companies by facilitating their financing. Strengthen 
the development of value chains. To achieve these immediate 
objectives, the component aims to support: SMEs; integrative 
projects; Research & Development projects; green projects. 








The project contributes to the self-employment and employment 
of young people (especially women and disadvantaged groups) in 
the horticulture, waste management, agri-food and handicrafts 
sectors. It also promotes the development of SMEs to contribute 
to the employment in the same sectors, while also contributing to 
the creation of a financial and educational environment conducive 





World Bank Nouadhibou Eco-
Seafood Cluster 
Project 
The objective is to support the development of a seafood cluster in 
Nouadhibou that promotes sustainable management of fisheries and 
generates value for the communities. The project comprises of two 
components. The first component, developing a sustainable seafood 
cluster in Nouadhibou will build the capacity of Nouadhibou Free 
Zone Authority (ANZF) and of stakeholders to plan, design, 
reorganize, and promote the cluster so that the objective of the 
sustainable management of fisheries resources is well integrated in 
the development of competitive seafood value chains that originate in 
Nouadhibou. It consists of two sub-components: (i) promoting public-
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private dialogue (PPD) in order to develop a vision for a sustainable 
seafood cluster in Nouadhibou and accelerate nationwide reforms of 
structures impeding its development; and (ii) generating responsible 
investments in the Nouadhibou seafood cluster. The second 
component, increasing the value of seafood products produced and 
marketed in the seafood cluster with the participation of local actors 
aims at increasing the value of seafood products produced and 
marketed in the seafood cluster and increasing the participation of 
the local population in the cluster’s activities. It consists of two sub-
components: (i) improving the handling of landed catch and 
promoting the export of fresh fish at the Nouadhibou seafood cluster; 
and (ii) building local suppliers’ and vulnerable groups’ capacities to 
capture greater benefits from productive and inclusive seafood value 
chains. The project ends in June 2020. 
http://projects.worldbank.org/P151058?lang=en  






To support the government capacity to drive negotiation towards final 
investment decision, and lay the foundations for the gas sector’s 
contribution to the economy through enhanced legal and regulatory 
frameworks and capacity building. There are three components to the 
project, the first component being capacity building and technical 
support for the GTA negotiations. The activities undertaken under 
Component A are designed to enable the GoM to develop the 
institutional capacities and to acquire the third‐party expertise needed 
to negotiate effectively a FID on the GTA. This capacity building and 
technical support will enable the Government to ratify the technical, 
legal, fiscal, commercial and financial agreements underpinning the 
FID. These capacities and expertise will also be applicable for gas 
prospects that could be identified and appraised during the life of the 
project. The second component is the strengthening of the 
institutional and regulatory framework. The objective of this 
component is to assist the GoM in updating its policy and strategy for 
the development of the gas sector. Finally, the third component is the 
project management and coordination. The component will provide 
targeted support to the project management and coordination in the 
amount of US$1 million, which will be used to finance the core project 
execution team and operating costs that are essential for effective 
project implementation. This will include financing the costs 
associated with the recruitment of a procurement specialist, an 
accountant, an administrative and financial officer, as needed to build 
the MPEM’s procurement, financial management, M&E capacities in 





FAO assistance in Mauritania is shaped by the four-year 2017-2021 
FAO Country Programming Framework (CPF), which focuses on four 
priority areas:  Supporting inclusive and sustainable agricultural, 
livestock and fisheries production to create employment and 
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strengthen the technical and operational capacities of rural people.  
Promoting an enabling institutional environment for achieving food 
security and nutrition through the diversification of food systems and 
the development of a nutrition-sensitive agricultural policy.  Ensuring 
the sustainable management of natural resources for a sustainable 
and resilient economy in the face of climate change, in particular 
through capacity building for local communities and the effective 
management of ecosystems. 
FAO Small Pelagic Fish 
Production 
Mauritania Ministry of Fisheries and Maritime Economy and FAO are 
working jointly to promote small pelagic fish production through the 
introduction of conservation techniques and the development of a test 
programme for improving processed products. The project was 
carried out in collaboration with the NGO “Muftah EL Khair”. Results 
achieved included: the use of conservation techniques for fish 
species such as machoiron, captain, sardinella and mullet; training 
for members of the NGO and other associated cooperatives on 
conservation techniques, including salting, drying, smoking and 
braising; the distribution and trading of processed fish in 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods of Nouakchott and; the development 
of a new technology for fish conservation. The project was part of a 
capacity building process for small-scale fishing stakeholders and the 




Project in cooperation with the European Commission. The aim is to 
promote sustainable employment and entrepreneurship development 




ILO Improving the 
employability of 
young people and 
the capabilities of 




The project runs until February 2020 and aims for more and better 
jobs for young people through development of the building and civil 
engineering sub-sector in local materials and professional training in 
building construction sites (known as PECOBAT). The project is 
funded by the European Union as the first action of the Emergency 
Trust Fund of the European Union for the Sahel and Lake Chad 
region of Mauritania. The aim of this joint work is to address the root 
causes of migration by ensuring access to employment for young 
people by creating better economic opportunities in Mauritania's 
migration basins. The project plans through a pilot action on two 
target regions in the south of the country, the creation of sustainable 
and quality employment in the sector of earth construction. The ILO 
facilitates the activation of this employment niche, encouraging key 
alliances between Mauritanian public authorities, the private sector 
and workers. It aims to promote employment as a rural and green 
development strategy through the participation of civil society actors 
and other actors at local level. Job opportunities for young men and 
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A total of 285,600 farmers, particularly women and young people, in 
six regions of southern Mauritania will benefit from a project designed 
to improve food security and nutrition, increase the incomes of rural 
poor households, create jobs and reduce the country's dependence 
on food imports. The Inclusive Value Chain Development Project 
(PRODEFI) builds upon IFAD's experience in the country and 
elsewhere in the region by adopting a poverty reduction approach 
based on supporting production and processing to respond to market 
demand. The first phase of the project will focus on horticulture, 
poultry farming, goat milk and non-timber forest products. Inland 
fishing will be tested around Lake Foum Gleita. Following market 
studies, new income-generating crops or activities will be defined for 
the second phase of the eight-year project. The farmers will receive 
training and advisory services to improve their production models and 
adapt them to climate change. In that regard, the project will facilitate, 
through an Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme 
(ASAP) grant, the use of solar energy -- from production to storage 
and processing – and promote sustainable management techniques 
for natural resources such as water, pasturelands and seeds. In 
addition, to better match supply and demand, PRODEFI will develop 
an inclusive approach, promoting public-private-producers 
partnerships (4Ps) in the interest of smallholder farmers and 
facilitating their access to markets, which proved to be a very 
powerful pathway to reduce poverty in the previous IFAD supported 
project, Value Chains Development Programme for Poverty 















The aim of the project, which runs until 2021, is to improve the 
employment situation of young people in selected regions of 
Mauritania and the rural structures for promoting employment are 
in place. The project covers two components of the EU’s 
Institutional Strengthening Programme for Agricultural and 
Pastoral Resilience in Mauritania. The project territory is in 
Southern Mauretania and comprises the region along the banks of 
the Senegal River, as well as the regions Assaba and Guidimaka. 
The project operates in the following fields of activity: 1. Local 
business development: helping rural areas develop the capacity to 
quickly create employment. 2. Labour market interventions: 
supporting the integration of young people in the economy and 
employment. 3. Vocational training: developing the planning and 
implementation capacities for short-term training programmes of 
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government and private actors. Promoting the vocational 
education and training of professionals to meet public and private 








The objective of Your Employment and Productive Inclusion Project 
for Niger is to expand income-generating activities for youths in 
selected poor areas. The project has three components. 1. Youth 
productive inclusion in rural areas component will deliver an 
integrated package of cross-cutting support services to address the 
main constraints that are preventing youths, and young women in 
particular, from engaging in more productive employment in rural 
areas. 2. Youth insertion in selected activities in semi-urban areas 
component will facilitate insertion in selected activities for youths 
living in semi-urban areas. In each participating commune with semi-
urban areas. The component will identify a few income-generating 
activities and trades that have the potential to be economically viable, 
have growth potential and can generate positive spillover effect on 
the local economy. The objective is to foster the development of off-
farm micro-enterprises by youths, but also unlock the potential for 
more efficient markets and better employment around the selected 
areas. The component will finance integrated support to facilitate 
youth insertion in these activities, including short-term technical 
training, life skills and entrepreneurship training, as well as start-up 
support including capital. 3. Institutional support and project 
management component will support the extension of employment 
support services to the commune level, coordination in the 
employment sector, and project management, including fiduciary 
matters, communication, planning, data collection, monitoring and 
evaluation activities under the project as well as a steering committee 
to oversee project implementation. The project runs till June 2023. 
http://projects.worldbank.org/P163157?lang=en  




The development objective of Fostering Rural Growth Reform 
Development Policy Financing (DPF) Project for Niger is to foster 
rural growth. It has two pillars: 1) Increasing rural productivity growth; 
and 2) Supporting growth enabling sectors. This document requires a 
DPF in the form of an IDA Grant and an IDA Credit. This is the first Of 
a programmatic series Of two single-tranche development policy 
operations. It is a single-tranche disbursement of 50 percent in the 
form of an International Development IDA regular credit terms with 
maturity of 38 years including a grace period of 6 years. The program 
supports the Government of Niger's growth and poverty reduction 
strategy through its emphasis on reforms for fostering rural growth 
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reform. It builds on the World Bank Systematic Country Diagnostic 
(SCD, August, 2017) and the incoming new Country Partnership 
Framework (CPF, 2018-2020). The project ends in December 2018. 
http://projects.worldbank.org/P163318?lang=en  
World Bank Skills 
Development for 
Growth Project 
The objective is to improve the effectiveness of formal technical and 
vocational training, short-term skills development, and apprenticeship 
programs in priority sectors. In 2018, additional financing was 
permitted for scaling up of successful activities supported under the 
original project and support new activities that will enhance the 
achievement of the project objective. Furthermore, the additional 
financing will support institutional reforms of the technical and 
vocational education and training (TVET) sector, thus contributing to 
the achievement of the human capital objectives of the Government’s 
new Economic and Social Development Plan. The additional 
financing also will introduce new activities to (a) expand project 
interventions in priority sectors such as agriculture and agribusiness, 
(b) provide start-up funds for young graduates who benefitted from 
the entrepreneurship training and those who will receive similar 
entrepreneurship training through continued activities, and (c) 
improve quality of project interventions, including monitoring and 
evaluation and communications for increased awareness of project 
activities. In all these proposed activities, the project will promote 
girls’ participation in the proposed activities and will highlight the need 
for the strong involvement of local communities and actors. 
http://projects.worldbank.org/P163467?lang=en  




The development objective of the Investment Climate and 
Competiveness Support Project for Niger is to improve critical 
elements of investment climate for the private sector and enhance 
competitiveness of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in selected 
agriculture value chain. The project comprises of three components. 
The first component, modernization of the business environment 
aims to support the implementation of reforms, which can be easy to 
implement and have a quick impact on the business environment. It 
consists of following two sub-components: (i) implementing 
investment climate reforms; and (ii) enabling institutions for private 
sector development. The second component, increase the 
competitiveness of selected agricultural value chains will contribute to 
improve the competitiveness of SMEs along the agricultural value 
chains in Zinder and Diffa. It consists of following four sub-
components: (i) support to the maison de l’entreprise (ME); (ii) 
provision of financial and non-financial business development 
services; (iii) infrastructure development; and (iv) community 
engagement. The third component, project implementation support 
will be undertaken mainly through the project implementation unit 
(PIU) of the International Development Association (IDA) - financed 
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competitiveness and growth support project through the on-going 
arrangements. The project ends in March 2019. 
http://projects.worldbank.org/P148839?lang=en  





The objective is to contribute to the emergence of decent rural jobs 
and the fight against poverty in Niger. The main effects are classified 
as follows: 1. The prevention of child labor in agriculture is improved 
2. The extent of child labour in agriculture is curbed 3. The issue of 
"child labour in agriculture" is better taken into account in policy and 
strategy instruments. This project ended in October 2018. 
http://www.fao.org/niger/programmes-et-projets/nos-projets/fr/  
 





The overall objective of the joint programme is to improve living 
conditions and strengthen the rights of rural women in the context of 
sustainable development by contributing to the strengthening of 
women's leadership, improving food and nutrition security, and 
contributing to women's economic empowerment. And increase rural 













ups in Niger 
(ProEMPLOI) 
The objective is to improve employment and income opportunities for 
the local population in the regions of Agadez and Zinder. The project 
is implementing measures to promote employment and business 
opportunities. These are supplemented by short-term actions 
designed to generate immediate income for the population. The 
project is making efforts to counter the precarious labour market 
situation as well as to tackle poverty in general. It utilises an 
integrated approach to employment promotion covering three pillars: 
labour market supply, demand and placement. Additionally, it seeks 
to improve the general conditions in the region. The project adopts a 
multilevel approach that specifically addresses four fields of activity: 
1. Strengthening regional structures and their ability to shape 
employment policies. 2. Implementing employment-promoting cash-
for-work measures. Regional dialogue and coordination among 
private and public stakeholders are being expanded. The project is 
supporting regional representatives and national ministries in 
effectively coordinating and implementing employment-relevant 
measures in accordance with regional development plans. This is 
also meant to foster decentralisation, which has so far progressed 
only slowly. The project is also promoting increased involvement by 
local political stakeholders in central decision-making and planning 
processes. 3. Improving the range of support measures aimed at 
promoting start-ups in potential growth sectors. 4. Enhancing access 
to business services among micro and small enterprises. The 
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project’s integrated, needs-based approach to improving income and 
employment opportunities includes identifying local business models, 
raising awareness, providing training, and offering advisory and 
coaching services. The project runs until 2020. 
https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/57419.html  
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